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Political Integration through Jurisprudence: An 
Analysis of the European Court of Justice's Rulings 
on Freedom of Movement for Workers 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The European Economic Community is an international association of sovereign 
states. 1 The purpose and tasks of the Community are set forth in the Preamble2 and 
Article 23 of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (the 
I. Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, March 25, 1957,298 V.N.T.S. 11 (1958) 
[hereinafter referred to as EEC Treaty, or the Treaty]. 
In addition to the European Economic Community, two other treaty-based communities exist: the 
European Coal and Steel Community and the European Atomic Energy Community. E. NOEL, WORK-
ING TOGETHER: THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 3 (1979) [hereinafter cited as NOEL]. 
The original six members of the European Community were Belgium, the Federal Republic of 
Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands.ld. at 3 n.I. In 1973, Denmark, Ireland and 
the Vnited Kingdom joined the European Economic Community.ld. at 3. Greece's accession in 1981 
gave the Community a total of ten Member States. ld. at 3 n.2. 
The major governing organs of the Community are the Commission, the Council of Ministers, the 
European Parliament and the Court of Justice. See D. LASOK & G. BRIDGE, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE 
LAW AND INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 99-169 (2d ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as 
LASOK & BRIDGE]. The Commission is composed of thirteen members from nine states chosen for their 
general competence in Community matters. ld. at 100. They are required to act solely in the interest of 
the Community.ld. Their independence from national interests makes the Commission a truly supra-
national institution. A "supranational" institution may at this point be defined simply as an institution 
"extending beyond or free of the political limitations inhering in the nation-state." WEBSTER'S THIRD 
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2298 (1976). "Supranational" is discussed at length in § ILA infra. 
The different roles of the Commission include acting as the executive arm of the Community, as 
initiator of Community policy, as guardian of the Treaties, and as exponent of the Community interest 
to the Council. See generally LASOK & BRIDGE, sufrra, at 104-09 and NOEL, sufrra, at 9-21. See also EEC 
Treaty, sufrra, art. 155. 
The Council is composed of one representative from each Member State government and as such 
represents the sovereignty of the Member States. LASOK & BRIDGE, sUfrra, at 11 O. The Commission 
submits its policy proposals to the Council for approval (generaUy upon a majority vote).ld. at 111-13. It 
is up to the Commission to initiate such proposals, otherwise the Council may take no action. NOEL, 
sUfrra, at 17. Once a proposal is lodged, a dialogue begins between the Council ministers, who represent 
their national points of view, and the Commission, which represents the interests of the Community as a 
whole. ld. Once a policy decision has been made by the Council, it confers upon the Commission the 
necessary executive powers to implement such policy. LASOK & BRIDGE, sUfrra, at Ill. 
As of July 1979, the European Parliament was composed of four hundred and ten representatives. 
NOEL, sufrra, at 23. It is a "fully-integrated Community institution:" there are no national representa-
tives, only European-level political groups. ld. at 22. Its functions are primarily of a supervisory and 
advisory nature. As an advisory organ, it must be consulted by the Council before the Council makes a 
final decision as to certain treaty matters. The Parliament's opinions are not binding, however. As a 
supervisory organ, it may force the Commission to resign by a motion of censure under Article 144. 2 
COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) ~ 4302.05. The Parliament also has certain budgetary powers. NOEL, sufrra, 
at 24-25. 
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Treaty).4 The short-term objective of the EEC Treaty was the establishment of a 
customs union.s The eventual and ultimate aim of the Treaty is complete economic 
union among Member States.6 
2. The Preamble provides that the signatories of the Treaty: 
DETERMINED to establish the foundations of an ever closer union among the European 
peoples, 
DECIDED to ensure the economic and social progress of their countries by common action in 
eliminating the barriers which divide Europe, 
DIRECTING their efforts to the essential purpose of constantly im proving the living and 
working conditions of their peoples, 
RECOGNISING that the removal of existing obstacles calls for concerted action in order to 
guarantee a steady expansion, a balanced trade and fair competition, 
ANXIOUS to strengthen the unity of their economies and to ensure their harmonious devel-
opment by red ucing the differences existing between the various regions and by mitigating the 
backwardness of the less favoured, 
DESIROUS of contributing by means of a common commercial policy to the progressive 
abolition of restrictions on international trade, 
INTENDING to confirm the solidarity which binds Europe and overseas countries, and desir-
ing, to ensure the development of their prosperity, in accordance with the principles of the 
Charter of the United Nations, 
RESOLVED 10 strengthen the safeguards of peace and liberty by establishing this combination 
of resources, and calling upon the other peoples of Europe who share their ideal to join in their 
efforts, 
HAVE DECIDED to create a European Economic Community .... 
EEC Treaty, sufrra note I. 
3. It shall be the aim of the Community, by establishing a Common Market and progressively 
approximating the economic policies of Member States, to promote throughout the Commu-
nity a harmonious development of economic activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, 
an increased stability, an accelerated raising of the standard of living and closer relations 
between its Member States. 
EEC Treaty, sufrra note 1, art. 2. 
4. EEC Treaty, sUfrra note I. 
5. Tbe community shall be based upon a customs union covering the exchange of all goods 
and comprising both the prohibition, as between Member States, of customs duties on importa-
tion and exportation and all charges with equivalent effect and the adoption of a common 
customs tariff in their relations with third countries. 
EEC Treaty, sUfrra note I, art. 9(1). A fully-implemented customs union is an arrangement whereby the 
members agree to treat the goods produced in other member countries as if they had been produced 
within their own borders. THE COMMON MARKET 2 (L. Krause ed. 1964) [hereinafter cited as THE 
COMMON MARKET]. Implementation of the customs union was completed in 1968. LASOK & BRIDGE, 
sUfrra note I, at 248. 
6. See EEC Treaty, sufrra note 1, art. 2. 
It has been suggested that customs union is a halfway house on the way to wider economic 
integration, a halfway house in which it is not possible to stay forever. The members must move 
on toward economic integration more speedily however specifically defined, or in time the 
customs union will break down. 
C. KINDLEBERGER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 194 (4th ed. 1966) [hereinafter cited as KINDLEBERGER]. 
In 1967, the Commission reported that the Community was then at an intermediate phase consisting of 
a completed customs union but only partial economic union. 
In the years to follow, the main objective should be to achieve economic union - sine qua non if 
the common market is to function properly .... Economic union means all the measures 
required to create on the territory of the Community conditions similar to those obtaining on a 
domestic market. These are: (a) free movement of goods; (b) free movement of persons, 
services, and capital; (c) implementation of the common transport policy; (d) arrangements to 
protect competition from distortion; (e) provisions to guarantee that the economic policies of 
the Community and the Member-States share the elements needed to secure condititions 
similar to those obtaining on a domestic market. 
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY COMMISSION, TENTH GENERAL REpORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE 
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The free movement of workers within the Community is essential to the economic 
union of the EEC and to the system as established under the Treaty.7 Full integra-
tion of the Member States' economies requires the free movement of labor across 
borders.8 Free movement allows for the creation of an international rather than 
national division oflabor, enabling the economic forces of supply and demand in the 
employment marketplace to meet across national borders.9 As one author notes, 
"[F]rom an economic point of view it seems irrational that production in one place 
should be hampered by a shortage of labour, when at the same time people in 
another region are unemployed through a lack of jobs."lo 
Articles 48-51 of the Treaty implement the Community's economic objectives by 
providing for the free movement of workers within the Community. Article 48 
requires the general elimination of barriers to freedom of movement. 11 Article 48(2) 
incorporates Article 7's explicit prohibition against discrimination on the grounds of 
nationality, the most prominent obstacle to freedom of movement and to the 
COMMUNITY 13 (June 1967). According to Professor Charles P. Kindleberger, international economic 
integration requires not only free trade and an eradication of barriers to factor movement, but also 
harmonization of tax, wage, foreign exchange, monetary and fiscal policies. KINDLEBERGER, sUfrra, at 
533. 
While recognized long before the post-war era, the advantages of economic integration became more 
important in the 1950's because technological developments increased the size of the market necessary 
to support efficient industry. European firms in small, fragmented markets could not compete with 
large U.S. firms. Larger markets and protection from U.S. products were thought necessary to sustain 
Euopean growth. Economic integration was seen as providing both. L. KRAUSE, EUROPEAN ECONOMIC 
INTEGRATION AND THE UNITED STATES 4 (1968) [hereinafter cited as KRAUSE]. 
European economic integration seems to have had the desired effect. Between 1959 and 1971, 
intra-Community trade grew at a rate of 15% whereas world trade grew at a rate of only 8%. P. 
MAILLET, THE CONSTRUCTION OF A EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 13 (1977). 
7. EEC Treaty, sufrra note I, arts. 48-51. See Bonsignore v. Oberstadtdirektor der Stadt Kiiln, 1975 E. 
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 297, 314, 15 Comm. Mkt. L. R. 472, 483. 
8. The free movement of all factors of production is a necessary element of economic integration. See 
note 5 sUfrra. 
9. B. SUNDBERG-WEITMAN, DISCRIMINATION ON GROUNDS OF NATIONAUTY: FREE MOVEMENT OF 
WORKERS AND FREEDOM OF ESTABUSHING UNDER THE EEC TREATY 128 (1977) [hereinafter cited as 
SUNDBERG-WEITMAN]. 
10. [d. 
II. Article 48 provides: 
I. The free movement of workers shall be ensured within the Community not later than at the 
date of the expiry of the transitional period. 
2. This shall involve the abolition of any discrimination based on nationality between workers 
of the Member States as regards employment, remuneration and other working conditions. 
3. It shall include the right, subject to limitations justified by reasons of public order, public 
safety and public health: 
(a) to accept offers of employment actually made; 
(b) to move about freely for this purpose within the territory of Member States; 
(c) to stay in any Member State in order to carry on an employment in conformity with the 
legislative and administrative provisions governing the em ployment of the workers of that State; 
and 
(d) to live, on conditions which shall be the subject of implementing regulations to be laid 
down by the Commission, in the territory of a Member State after having been em ployed there. 
4. The provisions of this Article shall not apply to em ployment in the public administration. 
EEC Treaty, sUfrra note I, art. 48. 
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establishment of economic union. 12 Article 49 implements Article 48 by specifically 
authorizing the Community Council to enact legislation in two areas. The Council 
may act to remove administrative procedures which hinder the movement of labor, 
"and may set up machinery for better equating labour supply with demandY Article 
50 encourages Member States to establish joint programs for the exchange of young 
workers.14 Finally, Article 51 authorizes the Council to adopt harmonizing social 
security legislation so that different national social security systems will not deter 
workers from crossing national borders.15 
Apart from purely economic considerations, however, the guarantee of freedom 
of movement for workers also contributes to social progress within the Commu-
nity.16 First, freedom of movement may reduce unemployment and overpopula-
tion, and may thereby contribute to improving the overall standard ofliving within 
the Community.17 Second, the guarantee of freedom of movement is a personal 
12. !d., art. 48(2). Article 7 provides in part: "Within the field of application of this Treaty and 
without prejudice to the special provisions mentioned therein, any discrimination on the grounds of 
nationality shall hereby be prohibited." [d., art. 7. 
13. Article 49 provides: 
Upon the entry into force of this Treaty, the Council, acting on a proposal of the Commis-
sion and after the Economic and Social Committee has been consulted, shall, by means of 
directives or regulations, lay down the measures necessary to effect progressively the free 
movement of workers, as defined in the preceding Article, in particular: 
(a) by ensuring close collaboration between national labour administrations; 
(b) by progressively abolishing according to a plan any such administrative procedures and 
practices and also any such time-limits in respect of eligibility for available employment as are 
applied as a result either of municipal law or of agreements previously concluded between 
Member States and the maintenance "of which would be an obstacle to the freeing of the 
movement of workers; 
(c) by progressively abolishing according to a plan all such time-limits and other restrictions 
provided for either under municipal law or under agreements previously concluded between 
Member States as im pose on workers of other Member States conditions for the free choice of 
employment different from those imposed on workers of the State concerned; and 
(d) by setting up appropriate machinery for connecting offers of employment and requests 
for em ployment, with a view to equilibrating them in such a way as to avoid serious threats to 
the standard of living and em ployment in the various regions and ind ustries. 
[d., art. 49. 
14. !d., art. 50. 
15. Article 51 provides: 
The Council, acting by means of a unanimous vote on a proposal of the Commission, shall, in 
the field of social security, adopt the measures necessary to effect the free movement of 
workers, in particular, by introducing a system which permits an assurance to be given to 
migrant workers and tbeir beneficiaries: 
(a) that, for the purposes of qualifying for and retaining the right to benefits and of the 
calculation of these benefits, all periods taken into consideration by the respective municipal 
law of the countries concerned, shall be added together; and 
(b) that these benefits will be paid to persons resident in the territories of Member States. 
[d., art. 51. 
16. SUNDBERG-WEITMAN, supra note 9, at 129. Member States' cooperation toward the free 
movement of labor is one facet of the general social policy of the Community. Article 117 provides: 
"Member States hereby agree upon the necessity to promote improvement of the living and working 
conditions of labour so as to permit the equalisation of such conditions in an upward direction." EEC 
Treaty, supra note 1, art. 117. 
17. SUNDBERG-WEITMAN, supra note 9, at 129. It was with these considerations in mind that the 
European Social Fund and the European Coordination Bureau for Matching Job Offers and Applica-
1983] POLITICAL INTEGRATION THROUGH JURISPRUDENCE 277 
right. 18 Employers may not regard workers merely as factors of production under 
the freedom of movement provisions. 19 Instead, these provisions secure for workers 
and their families the fundamental right of mobility.20 Freedom of movement is one 
of the means by which a worker may improve his social condition while at the same 
time helping to satisfy the requirements of the economies of the Member States.21 
Finally, the free movement of labor is integral to the achievement of political 
objectives.22 Removal of barriers to movement is among the first steps of a process of 
human integration toward a Community citizenry.23 The political unification of 
Europe was in fact a long-term goal of the Treaty at the time of its creation.24 The 
creators of the community structure saw the formation of a political union as a 
desired consequence of the Treaty's blueprint for economic integration.25 Although 
the system as established under the Treaty is geared primarily toward the realization 
of economic objectives, the processes of economic integration and political integra-
tion must, to a certain extent, proceed together. 26 The complete integration of 
tions were established. The task of the Fund is to promote "employment facilities and the geographical 
and occupational mobility of workers" and thereby "contribute to raising the standard of living .... " 
EEC Treaty. supra note I. art. 123. The main feature of the Fund's policy is the reimbursement of 
Member State governments with 50% of any expenditures they may incur in retraining or resettling 
un~mployed or underemployed labor. D. McLACHLAN & D. SWANN, COMPETITION POLICY IN THE 
EuROPEAN COMMUNITY 413-14 (1967). The Coordination Bureau acts as a clearinghouse to bring 
employers and workers together. I COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) ~ 1022.22. 
18. SUNDBERG-WEITMAN, supra note 9, at 130. 
19. Se., Mr. and Mrs. F. v. Belgian State, 1975 E. Comm. Ct.]. Rep. 679, 696, 16 Comm. Mkt. L. R. 
442, 450. 
20. Reg. 1612168, 11].0. COMM. EUR. (No. L. 257) 2 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Reg. 1612/68]. See 
text accompanying note 84 infra. 
21. Preamble to Reg. 1612/68, supra note 20. 
22. D. WYATT & A. DASHWOOD, THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF THE EEC 126 (1980) [hereinafter cited as 
WYATT & DASHWOOD]. 
23. SUNDBERG-WpTMAN, supra note 9, at 131. In 1968, the vice-president of the Commission 
discerned in Articles 48-51 not merely an economic purpose but "an incipient form ... of European 
citizenship." I BULL. EUR. COMM. 5-6 (1968), as qwted in Plender, "An Incipient Form of European 
Citizenship," in EUROPEAN LAW AND THE INDIVIDUAL 39, 40 (F. Jacobs ed. 1976). 
24. P. PESCATORE, THE LAW OF INTEGRATION 23-25 (1974) [hereinafter cited as PESCATORE]. Political 
unification was seen as a means of countering the Soviet threat to Europe as well as giving Europe a 
greater voice in the world political developments, dominated since World War II by the United States 
and the Soviet Union. It seemed that the only way that the European countries could escape being "a 
footnote to history" was to create an integrated European system. KRAUSE, supra note 6, at 5-6. 
25. Wyatt and Dashwood describe the EEC Treaty as "an attempt to achieve a ... political aim by 
means of economic integration." WYATT & DASHWOOD, supra note 22, at 126. 
26. THE COMMON MARKET, supra note 5, at 2-3. Ernst Haas recognizes this close relationshi p between 
economic and political integration: 
The essense of supra nationality lies in the tendency for economic and social decisions to "spill 
over" into the realm of the political, to arise from and further influence the political aspirations 
of the major groups and parties in democratic societies. The supranational style stresses the 
indirect penetration of the political by way of the economic because the "purely" economic 
decisions always acquire political significance in the minds of the participants. 
E. Haas, Technocracy, Pluralism and the New Europe, as reprinted in E. STEIN, P. HAY, & M. WAELBROECK, 
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW AND INSTITUTIONS IN PERSPECTIVE 24 (1976). 
Leo Tindemans, the Prime Minister of Belgium, has similarly stated: "[T]he day that Europeans can 
move about within the Union, can communicate among themselves and when necessary receive medical 
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Member States' economies necessarily involves the partial surrender by Member 
States of sovereignty over their internal affairs to the governing institutions of the 
Community.27 Theoretically, such political integration28 should continue unless a 
point is reached at which Member States consider their remaining sovereignty more 
valuable than the benefit to be gained from further integration. 
The European Court of justice (Eej) plays an important role in the economic 
integration of the Community,29 since its function is to interpret the provisions 
of the EEC Treaty.3o This Comment will explore the nature and extent of the 
ECl's concommitant role in the political integration of the Community. The 
analysis of this role will focus specifically on the ECl's decisions concerning 
freedom of movement of workers. These cases illustrate the Court's role in the 
political integration of the EEC and provide a workable model with which to 
study that process. The author will demonstrate that the ECj fulfills its integra-
tive role by (1) recognizing individual rights created under Community law, 
(2) injecting these guarantees of Community law into the laws of the Member 
States, and (3) sustaining the supranational structure of the Community. 
Although the net effect of these judicial functions is to advance the political 
integration of the Community, the author will demonstrate that the Court's 
integrative role is limited. This limit is the point where Member States are no 
longer willing to sacrifice control over their internal affairs for the sake of the 
Community. The Treaty recognizes and provides for this limit in its freedom of 
movement provisions by allowing Member States to restrict worker movement in 
two situations: where the worker is a member of the host state's "public service", 
and where the host state's "public policy" necessitates this restriction. The author 
will demonstrate that the ECl's interpretation of these provisions has had the 
effect of preserving an important area of discretion and autonomy for the 
care without national frontiers adding to the problems of distance, European Union will become for 
them a discernible reality." BULL. EUR. COMM. (Supp. 1/76) at 27-28. 
/d. 
27. LASOK & BRIDGE, supra note I, at 24. 
[I]t is always possible to maintain the status quo and so reduce the Community to political 
stagnation. The Community itself has a built-in system which may either advance it towards 
political and institutional integration or preserve the self-contained units of sovereign states 
whilst developing the economy and creating wealth within the existing institutions. This 
depends on whether the Community institutions are strengthened at the expense of 
sovereignty or whether the sovereign element keeps the Community institutions in the servile 
role of functional bueraucracy. 
28. Political integration is the process where political actors in several distinct national settings are 
• persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political settings to a new center, whose 
institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states. The result of a 
process of political integration is a new political community, superimposed over the pre-
exis.ting ones. 
E. HAAS, THE UNITING OF EUROPE 16 (1958) [hereinafter cited as HAAS]. Political integration is discussed 
further in § II.A infra. 
29. See generally C. MANN, THE FUNCTION OF JUDICIAL DECISION IN EUROPEAN ECONOMIC INTEGRA-
TION (1972) [hereinafiter cited as MANN]. 
30. EEC Treaty, supra note I, art. 164. 
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Member States. However, the author concludes that the ECj must balance the 
goal of preserving Member State autonomy in areas that remain important to 
them with that of continuing political integration through the transfer of state 
sovereignty to the Community as a whole. The ECj must guard against the 
potential use of these exceptions by Member States to unduly restrict the guaran-
tee of freedom of movement, thereby retarding the political integration of the 
Community. 
II. POLITICAL INTEGRATION THROUGH JURISPRUDENCE 
A. Political Integration 
Political integration IS the process by which previously independent and 
sovereign states place themselves under common political authority.3! The 
theory of political integration rests upon the concept of the divisibility of 
sovereignty;32 that is, the states involved in the process of integration gradually 
transfer elements of their sovereign powers to a common authority. The extent 
of integration of a group of nations depends largely upon the power of the 
integrating forces and the degree to which individual nations are willing to 
sacrifice their sovereign powers. Thus far, the EEC Treaty has succeeded in 
inducing the Member States to transfer elements of their sovereign powers to the 
institutions of the Community.33 As a result, the Community has been described 
as "federal"34 and "supranational."35 
A federation is a union of independent states which share some, but not all, of 
their individual sovereignty.36 This unification enables states to attain certain 
31. A. GREEN, POLITICAL INTEGRATION BY JURISPRUDENCE 9 (1969) [hereinafter cited as GREEN]. 
Green defines political integration as a result. He does so to make it easier to identify the causes of 
processes which produce integration. /d. at 10. Another author defines integration generally as "the 
amalgamation of two or more units or of some of their functions. It is a non-technical, descriptive -
often political - concept which emphasizes the process of integrating as well as a particular condition or 
level of integrated ness." P. HAY, FEDERALISM AND SUPRANATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 1 (1966). Professor 
Ernst B. Haas defines political integration as a process. See note 28 supra. 
The Community may be examined at anyone stage of its development as a result of political 
integration. However, it would be inaccurate to assume from such an examination that the Community 
or political integration describes a static pattern. Member States are continually shifting "their loyalties, 
expectations and political settings to a new center," HASS. supra note 28, at 16, and are thereby 
sacrificing elements of their national sovereignty for the sake of the Community as a whole. 
32. PESCATORE. supra note 24, at 30. This concept is contrary to the traditional conception in 
international law that sovereignty is indivisible. Id. 
33. Scheuing, Integration by Law: TIu! Case oJtlu! European Community, 11 TEXAS INT'L L. J. 549, 550 
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Scheuing]. However, Scheuing identifies inherent weaknesses in the powers 
of the Commission, Council and Parliament as detracting from the integrative strength of the Treaty. 
Id. at 559-69. 
34. See, e.g., GREEN, supra note 3 I, at 10- I 8. 
35. See, e.g., PESCATORE, supra note 24, at 49. For an extensive analysis of the proper classification of 
the EEC, see P. HAY, FEDERALISM AND SUPRANATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 17-78 (1966). 
36. GREEN, supra note 3 I, at 11. 
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common objectives and solve common problems more effectively.37 Federalism 
achieves centralization of power and purpose while allowing the individ ual states 
to retain a degree of sovereignty and continue to exercise non-common powers 
at the local level.38 Federalism is therefore a form of political integration. 39 
The EEC may qualify as a federation under this definition. However, the EEC 
lacks certain characteristics of historical federations. For exam pie, the EEC lacks 
traditional federal powers of diplomacy and the power to raise and maintain an 
army.40 Furthermore, the institutions of the Community41 do not comprise a 
central "government."42 Although classification of the community as a federa-
tion may therefore be imprecise, the EEC is also more than merely an interna-
tional organization of states, like the United Nations. International organizations 
generally have only deliberative and consultative powers. The EEC, on the other 
hand, possesses real powers of control and access which it may exercise over 
Member States and their nationals. 43 In contrast to international organizations, 
the Community institutions occupy more of a governing than mediating role; 
they stand over, rather than between, the Member States. 44 In this sense the 
Community represents "not so much the restriction on sovereignty as the partial 
transfer of sovereignty."45 Countries belonging to the United Nations have not 
made a similar sacrifice of their national sovereignty.46 
37. C. Friedrich, International Federalism in Theory and Practice, in SYSTEMS OF INTEGRATING THE 
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 117, 121 (E. Plischke ed. 1964) [hereinafter cited as Friedrich]. 
38. GREEN, supra note 31, at II. 
39. !d. at 10. Federalism has also been described more accurately as a process. 
Federalism should not be considered a term for a static pattern, designating a particular and 
precisely fixed division of powers between governmental levels. Instead, federalism seems the 
most suitable term by which to designate the process of federalizing a political community, that 
is to say, the process by which a number of separate political organizations, be they states or any 
other kind of associations, enter into arrangements for working out solutions, adopting joint 
policies, and making joint decisions on joint problems. 
Friedrich, supra note 37, at 126-27. 
40. GREEN, supra note 31, at 16-17. Green argues persuasively that the hesitation in classifying the 
EEC as a federation arises from the conception that it must have the characteristics common to historical 
examples of federations, e.g., the United States, West Germany and Switzerland. Historically, most 
federal states were created in response to the needs of diplomacy and defense. !d. The EEC was formed 
more specifically for economic purposes. See text accompanying notes 2-6 supra. Green argues that the 
historical motivations toward the federal state have more recently been replaced by the need of federal 
structures to remedy certain economic and social ills. GREEN, supra note 31, at 17-18. 
41. See note I supra. 
42. Monnet, A Ferment of Change, I J. COMMON MKT. STUDIES 203,206 (1962); LASOK & BRIDGE, supra 
note I, at 23. 
43. GREEN, supra note 31, at 9. 
44. I. CLAUDE, SWORDS INTO PLOWSHARES - THE PROBLEMS AND PROGRESS OF INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATION 109-12 (4th ed. 1971), reprinted in E. STEIN, P. HAY & M. WAELBROECK, EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITY LAw AND INSTITUTIONS IN PERSPECTIVE 25 (1976) [hereinafter cited as CLAUDE]. 
45. Id. 
46. PESCATORE, supra note 24, at 30-31. Pierre Pescatore writes that the United Nations is founded 
upon the classical international law concept of the indivisibility of state sovereignty. This indivisibility 
requires that the only form which arrangements between states may take is one of coordination and 
cooperation. Under this concept of sovereignty, there is "no possibility of explaining the kind of 
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The proper classification of the Community lies instead between the charac-
teristics of federations and international organizations.47 This intermediate posi-
tion is most accurately defined as "supranational."48 Three elements in particular 
are characteristic of supranational organizations such as the Community: (1) the 
acceptance by a group of states of a set of values and objectives common to them 
and to which they must subordinate their own national interests;49 (2) the 
willingness of the individ ual states to transfer to community institutions effective 
powers to achieve these objectives and their willingness to accept the decisions of 
Community institutions in matters falling within the scope of the Treaty;50 and 
(3) the autonomy of the Community power.51 By this definition, the suprana-
tional structure is similar to the federal structure, 52 but it lacks the narrowing 
characteristics which political scientists have associated with historical examples 
of federations. The fact that a crucial element of supranationalism is the sacrifice 
of national sovereignty for the sake of the Community indicates that supra-
nationalism, like federalism, is a form of political integration. 
The Treaty does not determine the specific form the completed process of 
political integration will assume nor does it provide a political model or time limit 
for completion of the integration. 53 Rather, the Treaty itself is of unlimited 
international relations ... which develop when the possibility of a division and a refashioning of 
sovereignties is admitted .... [A)lignments built upon a refashioning of sovereignties permit variations 
... far more diverse than those possible under the international law of cooperation." Id. at 30-31. 
Furthermore, because the theory of integration rests upon the divisibility of sovereignty, the "precon-
ceived idea of 'indivisible sovereignty' blinds men's minds to the phenomenon of integration." Id. 
at 31. 
47. CLAUDE, supra note 44, at 25. 
48. PESCATORE, supra note 24, at 49. 
49. !d. at 50. 
50. !d. at 50-51. 
51. Id. at 51. "Limitations on national sovereignty lose their edge when the operation takes the 
character of a pooling of powers in the hands of independent institutions not identified with the 
personality or interests of any of the participants." Id. at 33 (emphasis in original). The ECJ uses this 
concept of the necessity of autonomy as a ground for legitimizing its judgments and building a 
community consensus. Id. The constant development of a Community consensus among the Member 
States' authorities and nationals is essential to the establishment and growth of the Community legal 
order. MANN, supra note 29, at 37. 
52. CLAUDE, supra note 44, at 25. To describe the Community as supranational is to regard it as 
sufficiently advanced to be treated differently from international organizations; supranational institu-
tions are defined in terms of their approximation of federal governments and their deviation from 
international organizations. Id. The Community has been described as a "partial and incipient 
federalism," id.; as an association of sovereign states with "federal potential," LASOK & BRIDGE, supra 
note 1, at 27; and as "something half-way between a true federal structure and the kind of inter-
governmental cooperation we have seen in the past." Coppe, The Economic and Political Problems of 
Integration, 26 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 349, 353 (1961). The inexactness with which the Community 
can be classified has led at least one authority to define the Community as "sui generis." W. Hallstein, 
lecture delivered at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, April 16-18, 1962. 
[1962-1964 Transfer Binder "Europe Today") COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) ~ 9001. 
53. H. Ispen, Constitutional Perspectives of the European Communities, in BASIC PROBLEMS OF THE EURO-
PEAN COMMUNITY 196 (P. Dagtoglou, ed. 1975). 
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duration.54 One commentator sees the culmination of the process of political 
integration as the creation of a new state.55 Another suggests that: 
European integration is developing as various units and so can 
continue for a long time. One can only suspect what the end result 
will be; but it may not be quite off the mark to prophesy the estab-
lishment of a so far unknown pluralistic political structure. Such a 
structure could very well permit the nations concerned to maintain to 
a very large extent their identity, whilst at the same time they are 
included in organizations which transcend the national level.56 
As this commentator suggests, the final form of the Community is not as impor-
tant as the recognition that, at this stage of integration, there is an institutional 
order providing for the possibility of continued community development and 
integration of the Member States.57 
B. The Role of the European Court of Justice 
In a structure such as the Community, the ECl and the other Community 
institutions have the responsibility to harmonize the heterogeneous societies of 
the Member States and to counteract the forces of nationalism and self-interest 
which may divide and weaken the Community. 58 Among all of the Community 
institutions, the ECl has performed this function most effectively.59 Although 
the Community structure may only approximate a federation,60 the Treaty 
confers upon the ECl judicial powers similar to a supreme court in a federa-
tion. 61 The ECl upholds the supremacy and uniformity of Community law over 
Member State law and it keeps the Community institutions and Member State 
governments within the limits of their power as defined under the Treaty.62 
54. EEC Treaty, supra note I, art. 240. 
55. H. Schwarz, Federating Europe - But How' in BASIC PROBLEMS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 7 
(P. Dagtoglou ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as Schwarz]. 
56. H. Schneider, 'Zur politschen Theorie der Gemeinschaft; as quoted in BASIC PROBLEMS OF THE 
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 198 (P. Dagtoglou ed. 1975). 
57. Introduction to the Fourth General Report of the Commission of the EEC, I COMMUNITY TOPICS 
7 (1961). The process of integration has slowed in recent years, causing some commentators to believe 
that the Community is foundering. See, e.g., Scheuing, supra note 33, at 563, and R. MARJOUN, EUROPE 
IN SEARCH OF ITS IDENTITY 69-77 (1980). Although these claims are exaggerated, the Community has 
not progressed significantly beyond the common market state. See Stein, Treaty-Based Federalism, A.D. 
1979: A Gloss on Covey T. Oliver at the Hague Academy, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 897, 907 (1979). 
58. Schwarz, supra note 55, at 8. 
59. Dagtoglou, Introduction to BASIC PROBLEMS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY at xiv (P. Dagtoglou ed. 
1975); Feld & Slotnick, "Marslwlling" the European Community Court: A Comparative Study in Judicial 
Integration, 25 EMORY L. J. 317, 319-20 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Feld & Slotnick]. 
60. See note 52 supra. 
61. Feld. The European Community Court: Its Role in th'-Federalizing Process, 50 MINN. L. REv. 423, 423 
(1966). See generally Feld & Slotnick, supra note 59. 
62. GREEN, supra note 31, at 22-24; Mashaw, Federal Issues In and About the Jurisdiction of the Court of 
Justice of the European Communities, 40 TULANE L REv. 21, 53 (1965). 
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Furthermore, insofar as the provIsIons of the Treaty establishing the EEC 
embody the voluntary transfer of sovereign powers from the Member States to 
the institutions of the Community, the ECl's interpretation of these provisions 
renews the agreements of the Treaty and continues this transfer of power. The 
protection of Community law, which the Treaty assigns to the ECl,63 therefore, 
includes the guarantee of integration. 64 
III. FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT CASES 
The cases involving the guarantee of freedom of movement for workers 
illustrate the ways by which the ECl advances political integration by jurispru-
dence. In addition, the extent to which the ECl has recognized a freedom 
essential to both the economic and political integration of the Community, such 
as the guarantee of freedom of movement for workers, is one measure of the 
degree of political integration of the Community. 
A. The ECl Applies Community Law to the Individual 
The ECl first explicitly recognized the independent character of Community 
law in 1962, in Kledingverkoopbedrijf de Geus en Uitdenbogerd v. Robert Bosch GmbH 
et al. 65 The ECl did not provide a justification for an autonomous Community 
legal order66 until a year later in N. V. Algemene Transport en Expeditie Onderneming 
van Gend & Loos v. Netherlandse Administratie Der Belastingen. 67 The Court ob-
served in that case that the EEC Treaty is addressed to the peoples of the 
Community as well as to the Governments.68 The Court further noted that the 
purpose of the Treaty is the creation of a common market whose functioning 
directly concerns Community individuals, and that the Treaty created institutions 
whose exercise of power touches Community citizens. 69 From these observations, 
the ECl concluded that the Treaty constitutes a new legal order which imposes 
duties on and grants additional rights to individuals of the Member States. 70 
63. EEC Treaty, supra note I, art. 164. 
64. Nicolaysen, TIu! European Court: Its Work and Its Fulure, in BASIC PROBLEMS OF THE EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITY 166 (P. Dagtoglou ed. 1975). Walter Hallstein, former president of the Community, once 
stated: "The Court of Justice ... watches over the application of the Treaty and of the laws made by the 
Community. Community law lives and grows through the decisions taken by the Court, which in the last 
resort has the sole responsibility for interpreting it. It is therefore a major factor in integration." 
W. HALLSTEIN, THE TRUE PROBLEMS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 10 (address given at the University of 
Kiel, Germany, on February 19, 1965) (available at Harvard International Legal Studies Library). 
65. 1962 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 45, I Comm. Mkt. L. R. I. 
66. "Legal order" is used to denote not only different legal jurisdictions but also a different body of 
substantive and procedural law. 
67. 1963 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1,2 Comm. Mkt. L. R. 105. 
68. Id. at 12, 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 129. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. 
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I. An Independent Legal Order 
The major sources of this independent body of Community law are the 
provisions of the EEC Treaty and the regulations and directives issued by the 
Community Council and Commission 71 to implement these provisions.72 These 
provisions, regulations and directives provide the legal basis 73 for the approxi-
mately one hundred decisions which the ECl renders each year. 74 These deci-
sions in turn become part of a body of Community law which influences the 
individual national jurisdictions in their resolution of Community-related mat-
ters.75 
Among the clearest examples of this independent body of Community law are 
those instances in which the ECl gives language of the Treaty or other Commu-
nity legislation a particular community meaning. For example, in Hoekstra (nee 
Unger) v. Bestuur der Bedriyfsvereniging voor Detailhandel en Ambachten 76 (Unger), the 
court declared the term "wage earner or assimilated worker," as used in Regula-
tion 3/58, to be a Community concept. As such, the ECl defined the term in a 
manner consistent with the objectives of the Treaty.77 To these ends the ECl 
defined "wage earner" as including not only the individual who holds ajob at a 
given moment, but also the individual who, having left his job, is capable of taking 
another. 78 If national courts were free to specify which persons were "wage 
71. For a description of the legislative duties of the Council and Commission, see note I supra. 
72. MANN, supra note 29, at 344-49; Schermers, TIw European Court of Justice: Promoter of European 
Integration, 22 AM. J. COMPo L. 444, 454 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Schermers). See EEC Treaty, supra 
note I, art. 189. For a thorough discussion of the regulations and directives issued in the field of 
freedom of movement for workers, see WYATT & DASHWOOD, supra note 22, at 125-81; and Seche, Free 
Movement of Workers under Community Law, 14 C.M.L. REv. 385 (1977). 
73. MANN, supra note 29, at 344. 
74. Schermers, TIw Role oftlw European Court of Justice in the Harmonisation and Unification of European 
Law, in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND TRADE LAW 3, 5 (C. Schmitthoff & K. Simmonds eds. 1976). 
75. Id. For a discussion of the precedential power of the ECl's rulings, see notes 148-49 and 
accompanying text infra. 
76. 1964 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 177,3 Comm. Mkt, L.R. 319. Other terms in Articles 48-51 and the 
implementing legislation made pursuant thereto to which the ECj has given a community meaning 
include "public service," "public policy," and "personal conduct." For a discussion of these terms, see 
§ I1I.D infra. 
77. P. WATSON, SOCIAL SECURITY LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 60 (1980) [hereinafter cited as 
WATSON). 
78. Unger, 1964 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 185, 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 330-31. 
Unger was a Dutch national living in Amsterdam. While employed, she was compulsorily insured 
under the Dutch National Health Insurance Act (Ziektewet). When Unger temporarily left her em-
ployment to have a child, her compulsory insurance ceased; however, she was accepted as a beneficiary 
of voluntary insurance provided for by the same Act. When visiting her parents in Germany one month 
after leaving her job, Unger fell seriously ill and required immediate medical treatment. On her return 
to the Netherlands, she claimed reimbursement for the expenses she incurred in Germany. She was 
unable to obtain that reinbursement because, under the Ziektewet, voluntarily insured persons have a 
right to reimbursement for expenses incurred abroad only if they have been authorized to reside 
abroad for convalescent purposes by the defendant social security institution. Unger had no such 
authorization. She appealed this decision, claiming that she was entitled to reimbursement under 
Article 19(1) of Regulation 3/58. This Article provides that a "wage-earner or assimilated worker" shall 
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earners or assimilated workers," the Member States would have the power "to 
modify the meaning of the concept of 'migrant worker'79 and to eliminate at will 
the protection afforded by the Treaty to certain categories of person."80 This 
possibility would deprive Articles 48-51 of all meaning and hamper fulfillment of 
the aims of the Treaty.81 Thus, the ECl conferred a Community meaning on the 
term to preserve the effectiveness of Articles 48-5l. 82 
2. Community Law Confers Rights Upon the Community Individual 
The ECl's construction of a Community meaning for the team "worker" 
ensures that individuals falling within the definition of this term may invoke the 
guarantee of free movement provided by Articles 48-5l. The Unger court 
emphasized the importance of this guarantee when it recognized freedom of 
movement as one of the "foundations" of the Community.83 Community legisla-
tion also has recognized the close relationship between the right of free move-
ment and the economic objectives of the Treaty: 
Free movement is a basic right of workers and their families. The 
mobility of manpower within the Community must be one of the 
means of guaranteeing for the worker a possibility of improving his 
living and working conditions and thereby also helping to improve 
his social conditions while at the same time satisfying the needs of the 
economies of the Member States. 84 
The right of the migrant worker to acquire and retain legal rights under the 
social security systems of the various Member States, which derives from Article 
51 and the freedom of movement principle, exemplifies this basic relationship 
between economic objectives and individual rights. If national social security 
systems did not work together, the territorial limitations of those systems would 
seriously restrict the free movement of workers in three ways.85 First, by moving 
to another Member State, a worker could lose the contributions he made to the 
social security system of the previous Member State since contributions in one 
Member State would not give rise to benefits in another. 86 Second, if a worker 
receive benefits if his state of health while temporarily abroad necessitates immediate medical care. The 
Dutch court asked the ECl whether Mrs. Unger could be classified as a "wage-earner or assimilated 
worker" for the purposes of the Regulation. ld. at 179-80, 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 319-21. 
79. The "migrant worker" is not merely the seasonal worker but any worker who is a citizen of one 
EEC Member State and who works in another Member State. 
80. Unger, 1964 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 184, 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 331. 
81. /d. 
82. ld. 
83. ld., 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 330. 
84. Reg. 1612/68, supra note 20, as translated in I COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) ~ 1031. 
85. Wyatt, The Social Security Rights of Migrant Workers and Their Families, 14 Co MM. MKT. L. REv. 411, 
412 (1977). 
86. /d. 
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had temporarily left his family behind in another Member State, the law of the 
host state, while perhaps providing for increased payments because of a claim-
ant's dependents, could nevertheless condition the increased benefit on the 
presence of the dependents within its national territoryY Third, even though a 
claimant might satisfy the requirements for receipt of an old age pension, he 
could be denied those benefits because he had moved outside the Member 
State. 88 These limitations in the national systems impede the free movement of 
labor since a worker would be reluctant to move to another Member State if he 
might lose social security rights already acquired. 89 
Article 51 overcomes these limitations by deterritorializing90 and coordinating91 
the independent social security systems of the Member States so that, as a whole, 
they provide the migrant worker with constant social security protection.92 Social 
security rights accrue to the worker and the worker carries those rights with him 
wherever he moves throughout the Community.93 The ECl has contributed to 
the process of coordination by liberally defining the range of individuals entitled 
to Community social security benefits.94 In Unger,95 the ECl held that all persons 
subject to national society security legislation are "wage-earners or assimilated 
workers" for the purpose of Community law. 96 Under this interpretation, the 
87. [d. 
88. [d. 
89. WATSON, supra note 77, at 35. 
90. /d. 
91. /d. 
92. [d. at 36. "Coordination" should be distinguished from "harmonization." Harmonization brings 
about a change in the substance of national law (e.g., making benefits throughout the community the 
same amount) whereas coordination merely affects the sphere of operation of the existing systems, 
leaving the legal content itself unchanged. [d. at 30-31. Harmonization has not been particularly 
successful and is now seen only as a means of ensuring that certain minimum standards prevail. /d. at x. 
Harmonization, so that the same social security benefit amounts prevail throughout the Community, is 
not as crucial for free movement of workers as is the assurance that the worker will be covered upon 
moving to a new Member State. [d. at 50. 
Coordination involves two processes. First, by means of aggregation, a worker can gain title to benefits 
in one Member State on ,he basis of contributions made under the Social security system of another 
Member State. /d. at 36. Second, the costs of benefits paid to a worker are equitably distributed among 
the Member States under whose legislation the worker was insured. [d. A Member State is required to 
pay benefits only in proportion to the number of contributions made or periods of employment or 
residence spent by the worker in that Member State. [d. 
93. /d. at viii-ix. Furthermore, Article 51, like Article 48, is based on the fundamental right of 
non-discrimination on the basis of nationality. The rights of a worker recently arrived from another 
MePlber State are determined by national social security authorities in the same way as those for a 
worker who has been affiliated with the same social security system for his entire working life. /d. at ix. 
94. [d. at 63. By defining who is entitled to Community rights, the ECJ is involved in the process of 
coordination; that is, the Court determines the sphere of operation of social security systems and 
ensures that the migrant worker is continually protected. [d. at 31. The ECl is also harmonizing, 
however, by giving uniform meaning to those concepts which are to be applied throughout the 
Community. [d. at 41. 
95. The facts of Unger are discussed at note 78 supra. 
96. 1964 E. Comm. Ct.]. Rep. at 185, 3 Comm. Mkt, L.R. at 332. See WATSON, supra note 77, at 61. 
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insured but unemployed, such as Mrs. Unger,97 are entitled to Community social 
security benefits such as those granted under Regulation 3/58. 98 The Unger court 
also held that those insured under a national social security system and who 
move from one Member State to another for non-work-related reasons are 
entitled to Community social security benefits. 99 The ECl affirmed this holding 
in Hessische Knappschaft v. Maison Singer et Fils. 100 The Court supported its broad 
interpretation of Article 51 by reference to the ultimate purpose of that Article: 
the establishment of as complete freedom of movement for workers as possi-
ble. lol 
The ECl has been similarly liberal in interpreting Article 51 and its imple-
menting legislation in other cases that define "worker" or "wage-earner" for 
Community purposes.102 Rather than confining the bases for its holdings to the 
economic objective of Articles 48-51, the ECl often relies on the broader social 
97. Mrs. Unger had left work to have a child, but continued to be a beneficiary under the Dutch 
National Health Insurance Act. See note 78 supra. 
98. WATSON, supra note 77, at 61. Also, protection of Article 51 may extend to the self-employed 
under this interpretation. This interpretation is an extension of the scope of Articles 48-51, which are 
intended to cover only employees (those under a contract of employment). Articles 52-58, guaranteeing 
the right of establishment, cover the self-employed. The ECl could have avoided this extension by 
limiting the benefits of Reg. 3/58 to workers employed under a contract of employment. That it did not 
do so may be due to the difficulty involved in distinguishing between the employed and the self-
employed.ld. at 64. See Brack v. Insurance Officer, 1976 E. Comm. Ct.]. Rep. 1429, 18 Comm. Mkt. L. 
R..592, and De Cicco v. Landversicherungsanstalt Schwaben, 1968 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 473, 8 Comm. 
Mkt. L. R. 67 (where the ECl ruled that periods ofa worker's life spent self-employed would neverthe-
less be included with years spent as an employee and thus qualify the individual for social security 
benefits legislated under Article 51). 
99. WATSON, supra note 77, at 62. 
100. 1965 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 965, 5 Comm. Mkt. L. R. 82. This case involved a German national 
vacationing in France who was killed in a collision between his motorcycle and a cattle truck belonging to 
a company called Maison Singer et Fils. The German social security administration paid benefits to 
successors of the victim and claimed repayment from Maison Singer et Fils on the grounds that it had 
been subrogated to the successors under Article 52 of Regulations 3/58. Its action was dismissed by a 
lower French court because its considered Regulation 3 to apply only to migrant workers, whereas the 
victim was vacationing in France when the accident occurred. On appeal, the Cour d'Appel de Colmar 
asked the ECl for an interpretation of the proper scope of Regulation 3. [d. at 967, 5 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 
at 82-83. 
101. [d. at 971,5 Comm. Mkt. L. R. at 94. The Court stated: "It would not be in conformity with that 
spirit to limit the concept of , worker' solely to migrant workers stricto sensu or solely to workers required 
to move for the purpose of their employment." ld. 
102. See, e.g., Bestuur der Bedrifsvereniging voor de Metaalnijverheid v. Mouthaan, 1976 E. Comm. 
Ct.]. Rep. 1901. Article 7I(l)(b) of Reg. 1408171 requires that an individual be insured in the country of 
his last employment in order to be a "worker" eligible for unemployment benfits in his present host 
state. The ECl ruled that respondent should be regarded as a "worker" and entitled to unemployment 
benefits under this Article because, although he was technically uninsured in the Member State of his 
previous residence, he was nevertheless eligible for social security insurance. See also Mr. and Mrs. F. v. 
Belgian State, 1975 E. Comm. Ct. l, Rep. 679, 16 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 442, where the EC] included the 
child of a migrant worker within the scope of "worker" in Reg. 1408171 and so entitled him to benefits 
for the handicapped. In the ECl's view, members of an employed migrant worker's family should be 
entitled to the benefits granted under Member State legislation under the same conditions as nationals 
of the Member State. 
288 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. VI, No.1 
and political objectives of that right.lo3 As a result, the Court has expanded the 
class of beneficiaries afforded protection by Articles 48-51 to include individ uals 
other than merely wage-earners. I04 A consequence of the ECl's pursuit of as 
complete freedom of movement for workers as possible has been that rights will 
sometimes accrue to workers who are not migrants, or who are self-employed, or 
who are not workers at all. lo5 
The ECl has heard a large number of social security cases. I06 The result of 
these cases as a whole is that the ECl has broadened the privileges created by 
Community law. lo7 By increasing the quantity of rights recognized by Commu-
nity law, and by broadening the application of those rights already recognized, 
the ECl increases the amount of direct relationships which the supranational 
institutions of the community have with Community citizens. lo8 The result is an 
increase in community power and jurisdiction at the expense of Member State 
sovereignty in these areas. As long as the ECl continues broad recognition of 
individual rights under Community law, the Court will be promoting political 
integration. 10" 
B. The ECl Injects Community Law into the Law of the Member States 
Although Community law exists as a body oflaw independent from the domestic 
law of the Member States, Community law is not completely separate from the 
Member States' legal systems. According to the constitutional laws of the 
Member States, Community law, because it is embodied in a treaty, becomes part 
of Member State's legal systems by way of incorporation, either by implementing 
legislation or automatically, following an act of the executive. llo However, these 
processes do not resolve the crucial issue of which body of law controls in the 
event of conflict of laws. III 
103. WYATT & DASHWOOD, supra note 22, at 161. 
104. WATSON, supra note 77, at 64. This commentator writes that Articles 48-51 envision the free 
movement of workers, and that "[t]here was no intention to facilitate the free movement of the 
self-employed or to encourage the general flow of persons, for whatever reason, throughout the 
Community." Id. 
105. Id. 
106. For a detailed examination of these cases, see GREEN, supra note 31, at 255-90; WYATT & 
DASHWOOD, supra note 22, at 155-81; and WATSON, supra note 77. 
107. GREEN, supra note 31, at 290. "The doubtful questions presented to the Court in these cases have 
been resolved in favor of the existence of individual rights." Id. 
108. Id. at 255. 
109. Id. at 254-55. 
110. K. LIPSTEIN, THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY 22 (1974) [hereinafter cited as 
LIPSTEIN]. 
Ill. See generally, Bebr, How Supreme is Community Law in the National Courts?, II COMM. MKT. L. REv. 
3 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Bebr); Bebr, Directly Applicable Provisions of Community Law: Development of a 
Community Concept, 19 INT'L & COMPo L. Q. 257 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Directly Applicable Provisions); 
and Hay & Thompson, The Community Court and Supremacy of Community Law: A Progress Report, 8 V AND. 
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 651 (1974-1975). 
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1. The Priority of Community Law over National Law 
The EEC Treaty does not explicitly establish the supremacy of Community 
Law over domestic law. However, in Costa v. ENEL,112 the ECl held that when 
direct conflicts occur between national and Community law, Community law 
must prevail over domestic law. 113 This doctrine of supremacy rests on the 
Court's reasoning, expressed in the Van Gend & Loos case, 114 that Community law 
exists as an independent legal order created by the partial transfer of sovereignty 
from the Member States to the Community. I IS The ECl considers the supremacy 
of Community law to be the legal foundation of the Community, without which 
its legal order could not function effectively.116 Otherwise, Member States could 
frustrate the objects of the Treaty by enacting or maintaining domestic law that 
is inconsistent with the Treaty. The concepts of supremacy and an independent 
Community law are therefore linked by the EC]: 
[T]he law stemming from the Treaty, an independent source of law, 
could not, because of its special and original nature, be overridden 
by domestic legal provisions, however framed, without being de-
prived of its character as Community law and without the legal basis 
of the Community itself being called into question. 117 
a. The Concept of "Direct Applicability" 
Instead of ex plicitly proclaiming the supremacy of a particular provision of 
Community law, a second, more inconspicuous method by which the ECl may 
ensure the same result is by finding that provision to be "directly applicable."II" 
By declaring provisions of primary l19 or secondary120 Community law to be 
"directly applicable" within the Member States, the ECl directly confers upon 
Community citizens rights and obligations under Community law which each 
112. 1964 E. Comm. Ct.]. Rep. 585, 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 425. 
113. [d. at 593-94, 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 455-56. 
114. 1963 E. Comm. Ct.]. Rep. 1,2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 105. See text accompanying notes 67-70supra. 
115. 1963 E. Comm. Ct.]. Rep. at 12. 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 129. 
116. Bebr, sUfJra note III, at 3. 
117. Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E. Comm. Ct. ]. Rep at 594, 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 456. 
118. Bebr, sufJra note II, at 4. The ECj typically determines whether a provision of Community law is 
"directly applicable" when that provision is referred to the Court for interpretation under art. 177. See 
§ III. B. 2 infra. 
119. "Primary Community law" refers to provisions of the EEC Treaty. 
120. "Secondary Community law" refers to more specific regulations and directives issued to imple-
ment Treaty provisions. Article 189 provides in part: 
For the achievement of their aims and under the conditions provided for in this Treaty, the 
Council and the Commission shall adopt regulations and directives .... 
Regulations shall have a general application. They shall be binding in every respect and 
directly applicable in each Member State. 
Directives shall bind any Member State to which they are addressed, as to the result to be 
achieved, while leaving to domestic agencies a competence as to form and means. 
EEC Treaty, sufJra note I, art. 189. 
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Member State must recognize and protect. 121 Furthermore, domestic law which is 
inconsistent with Community law deemed to be "directly applicable" must be 
repealed or modified. '22 The guarantee of Community law supremacy is, there-
fore, inherent in a provision which the ECl deems "directly applicable."'23 
At the present time, the ECl has ruled only a limited number of EEC Treaty 
provisions to be "directly applicable."'24 A provision of Community law may be 
declared to be "directly applicable" by the ECl if it meets three criteria. 125 First, 
the provision must impose upon the Member States a clear and precise obliga-
tion. '26 Second, the provision must be unconditional; if, however, it is subject to 
exceptions, these exceptions must be strictly defined and delimited. '27 Finally, 
application of the Community rule must not depend upon any subsequent 
legislation by either Community institutions or Member State institutions, and 
the rule must not allow the Member States any discretionary power with respect 
to its application. '2 " 
b. Article 48 
The ECl first declared that Article 48's provisions guaranteeing freedom of 
movement for workers were "directly applicable" in E.C. Commission v. France. 129 
The Court focused on an alleged conflict between Article 3(2) of the French 
Merchant Seamen Code of 1926, which required that a certain proportion of the 
121. See Directly Applicable Provisions, supra note III, at 263. 
122. See Bebr, supra note III, at 4. 
123. See id. 
124. See LIPSTEIN, supra note 110, at 29-30. 
125. Van Duyn v. Home Office, 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1337, 1348, 15 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 1,8 
(opinion of Advocate General Mayras). The advocates-general are "standing amici curiae" who submit 
independent and impartial interpretations of Community law to the ECl in addition to the arguments 
of the parties. J. LANG, THE COMMON MARKET AND COMMON LAW 25 n.170 (1966) [hereinafter cited as 
LANG]. See EEC Treaty, supra note I, art. 166. 
126. Van Duyn, 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1348, 15 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 8. 
127. [d. 
128. [d. The statutes of the Community, those regulations issued by the Council and Commission 
pursuant to Article 189, are by definition "directly applicable" in each Member State EEC Treaty, supra 
note I, art. 189(2). However, to determine whether a measure is in fact a "regulation" within the 
meaning of Article 189 and has immediate legal effects with regard to the persons designated, the 
contents of the measure must conform to the three criteria outlined above. LIPSTEIN, supra note 110, at 
30-31. The ECJ has ruled that directives may also be "directly applicable," despite the distinction drawn 
by Article 189, see note 120 supra, if the directive permits no discretionary interpretation by the Member 
States. Van Duyn, 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1348, 15 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 16. "It is necessary to 
examine, in every case, whether the nature, general scheme and wording of the [directive] in question 
[is] capable of having direct effects on the relations between Member States and individuals." [d. 
Otherwise, 
!d. 
where the Community authorities have, by directive, imposed on Member State the obligation 
to pursue a particular course of conduct, the useful effect of such an act would be weakened if 
individuals were prevented from relying on it before their national courts and the latter were 
prevented from taking it into consideration as an element of community law. 
129. 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 359, 14 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 216. 
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crew of a ship must be French nationals,130 and Article 48 of the EEC Treaty, 
which requires "the abolition of any discrimination based on nationality between 
workers of the Member States as regards employment, remuneration and other 
working conditions."l:n Specifically, the Commission regarded the French law to 
be incompatible with Article 4 of Regulation 1612/68,132 issued under Article 48 
of the Treaty. 
The French government argued that it had not discriminated against nationals 
of other Member States because oral directions had been given by the govern-
ment to maritime authorities requiring that nationals of the Community be 
regarded as French nationals. 133 The ECj, however, found that the wording of 
the French Seamen Code and mere oral instructions given to maritime au-
thorities gave rise to an ambiguous state of affairs. 134 This ambiguity left nation-
als from other Member States uncertain as to their possible rights under Com-
munity law, and thus constituted an obstacle to access to employment. 135 The 
Court ruled that Article 4R and Regulation 1612/68 were "directly applicable" in 
the legal system of every Member State. 136 
The ECj reconfirmed in Van Duyn v. Home Office that Article 48 is "directly 
applicable" and thus confers on individuals rights which they may enforce in 
domestic courtS. 137 The Court recognized that Article 48 im poses "on Member 
States a precise obligation which does not req uire the adoption of any further 
measure on the part of either the Community institutions or the Member States 
and which leaves them, in relation to its implementation, no discretionary 
power."138 Regulations and directives issued under Article 49 to insure the free 
movement of labor do not create any new rights in favor of persons protected by 
Community law, but simply set forth detailed rules for the exercise of rights 
conferred directly by Article 48. 139 
130. [d. at 361, 14 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 217. In addition, Ministerial Orders of 1960 and 1969 
provided that certain jobs on board ship be exclusively reserved to French nationals and that employ-
ment generally be limited to French nationals in a three-to-one ratio. !d. 
13.1. EEC Treaty, supra note I, art. 48. 
132. Reg. 1612/68, supra note 20, art. 4. Article 4 of Reg. 1612/68 provides in part: "(I) Legislative, 
regulatory, and administrative provisions of the Member States that restrict the employment of foreign 
workers to a certain number or percentage per enterprise. industry, or region, or for the State as a 
whole, shall not be applicable to nationals of the other Member States." !d., as translated in I COMMON 
MKT. REP. (CCH) ~ 103lD. 
133. 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 376, 14 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 220. 
134. [d. at 372, 14 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 230. 
135. [d. at 373,14 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 230. Moreover, the Court found that freedom of movement 
for workers in the French Merchant Marine "continues to be considered by the French authorities not 
as a matter of right but as dependent on their unilateral will." !d. at 372, 14 Common Mkt. L.R. at 230. 
136. [d. at 371, 14 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 229. "[T]hese provisions give rise, on the part of those 
concerned, to rights which the national authorities must respect and safeguard and as a result of which 
all contrary provisions of internal law are rendered inapplicable to them." [d. 
137. 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1347, 15 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 15. 
138. !d. 
139. Procureur du Roi v. Royer, 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 497, 512, 18 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 619, 638. 
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The concept of "direct applicability" is an important integrative tool. The 
direct applicability of certain Community law makes an individual falling within 
the scope of that law (e.g., Community workers fall within the scope of Article 
48) a "private attorney general," a custodian of Community law who can enforce 
a Member State's obligations to him under that law in proceedings before 
national courts. 140 Member States must therefore expect legal action whenever 
their behavior is incompatible with Community law and thereby injures the 
rights and interests of private parties. 141 With respect to the right of freedom of 
movement, every migrant worker in the Community becomes a possible plaintiff 
seeking to ensure that his conditions of employment are equal to the domestic 
worker and that his freedom of movement as guaranteed under Community law 
is not impaired by Member State legislation or administrative practice. 
2. Preliminary Rulings under Article 177 
a. Mechanics of Preliminary Rulings 
Many of the provisions of the EEC Treaty and most of the regulations issued 
pursuant thereto take effect upon issuance and become part of the national law 
which governs legal relations within each of the Member States.142 National 
courts within each Member State, therefore, frequently confront questions con-
cerning the interpretation of Community law and the validity of acts of Commu-
nity institutions. Under the procedure described in Article 177,143 inferior na-
tional courts may refer questions of Community law to the ECJ.I44 National 
courts of final appeal are required to refer such questions to the ECJ.145 
The national court, rather than the parties to the litigation, formulates the 
issues for ECl review. 146 The ECl may resolve only specific questions of Com-
munity law; it may not rende~ a decision on the merits of a particular case. 147 
140. Scheuing, supra note 33, at 556. 
14l. See PESCATORE, supra note 24, at 100. 
142. See note 124 supra. See also Donner, National Law and the Case Law of the Court of Justice of the 
European Communities, 1 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 8 (1963). 
143. EEC Treaty, supra note I, art. 177. 
144. LANG, supra note 125, at 2l. 
145. Id. at 22. National courts of last resort must refer a question to the ECl only if its resolution is 
essential to the resolution of the case.ld. A national court that is obliged to refer a question oflaw to the 
ECl may decline to do so on the grounds that the issue of Community law is clear and requires no 
further interpretation by the Court. Id. See Pescatore, Interpretation of Community Law and the Doctrine of 
'Acte Chair', in LEGAL PROBLEMS OF AN ENLARGED EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 41-45 (Bathurst, Simmonds, 
Hunnings & Welch eds. 1972). 
146. MANN. supra note 29, at 383-84. However. there may be "participants" in the proceeding before 
the ECl. whether a Member State. Community organ or the parties themselves. who may submit 
memoranda and suggestions to the Court. Id. at 383 n.323. 
147. LIPSTEIN. supra note 110, at 330. In certain cases it may not be possible for a national court to 
formulate a question of Community law interpretation in the abstract. In such cases, the ECl has 
applied the Treaty to the facts as found by the national court in order to better determine the content of 
the abstract question before it. Id. at 32 n.5; LANG, supra note 125. at 25-26. 
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Once the ECl has interpreted the Community law to which it has been referred, 
the national court applies that interpretation to the facts of the original case. The 
ECl's interpretation is binding, as a matter of law, only on the national court 
which refers the question to it and on all other national courts concerned with 
the same case. 148 However, as a matter of practice, it is likely that other national 
courts of the same or any other Member State, later faced with the same 
question, will follow the ECl's interpretation. 149 
b. Application of the Preliminary Ruling Process 
The ECl normally reviews in Article 177 freedom of movement cases the 
allegedly discriminatory effects of national social and labor legislation on EEC 
non-national workers. Under the provisions of Article 48, the ECJ is bound to 
ensure that EEC non-nationals are treated the same as nationals with regard to 
conditions of employment;150 otherwise, significant barriers to free movement 
between Member States may result. 
The case of Marsman 1'. Rosskamp,151 for example, arrived before the Eel 
under Article 177. In that case, the plaintiff, a Dutch national residing in 
Holland, worked as a metal worker in West Germany. The plaintiff's employer 
148. E. WALL, THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 131 (1966) [hereinafter cited 
as WALL); LANG, supra note 125, at 26. If the same issue arises again in another proceeding before a 
national court, the ECl's earlier decision does not become binding precedent to that court. Grementieri 
& Golden, The United Kingdom and the European Court of Justice: An Encounter Between Common and Civil 
Law Traditions, 21 AM.]. COMPo L. 664, 684 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Grementieri & Golden). Article 
177 allows a national court to refer such questions to the ECj again, even though the issue may have 
been decided earlier. Id. at 684 n.95. This procedure permits the ECj to amend an earlier interpretation 
of Community law. Such an opportunity is now before the ECj in the context of freedom of movement 
of workers. See note 317 and accompanying text infra. 
The United Kingdom's entry into the EEC in 1973 presented the problem of how to reconcile the 
Community system of preliminary rulings with the common law rule of stare decisis. 
The distinction in art. 177 between lower courts and the highest jurisdictions is based on the 
Civil Law principle that only decisions of the court of last resort have any real influence on the 
national jurisprudence. One must speak of "influence," of course, since it is theoretically 
contrary to Civil Law notions to speak of "precedent" as having any binding law-making effect 
beyond the case at hand. Due to the de facto general influence of decisions rendered by highest 
courts of the original member States, the Communities felt that preventing interpretation of 
Community law by such courts was necessary to guarantee against divergent national interpre-
tations of that law. On the other hand, lower national courts are permitted to give interpreta-
tions of Community law, since even if such interpretations were erroneous, they would have no 
meaningful influence beyond the immediate case. 
Grementieri & Golden, supra, at 686-87. The United Kingdom's accession to the EEC and the obser-
vance of the rule of stare decisis in that country means that binding precedents may be formed by the 
decisions of lower courts which are not required to refer questions of community law to the EC]. !d. at 
687. The likely result is non-uniform interpretations of community law. One solution is to eliminate the 
rule ofstare decisis for domestic British decisions pertaining to Community law. LANG, supra note 125, at 
20. Another authority suggests amending art. 177 to require that all courts of the Member States refer 
questions of Community law to the EC]. Grementieri & Golden, supra, at 688-89. 
149. WALL, supra note 148, at 131, 138-39. 
150. EEC Treaty, supra note I, art. 48(2). Article 48(2) incorporates the Treaty's general prohibition 
against discrimination on the ground of nationality contained in Article 7. 
151. 1972 E. Comm. Ct.]. Rep. 1243, 12 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 501. 
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dismissed him when the plaintiff was incapacitated in an industrial accident. 152 
Section 14 of the German Serious Injuries Act of 1953 required assent of the 
principal social security department before an employer could dismiss an em-
ployee. 153 The plaintiff's employer argued that the provision was inapplicable 
to non-Germans, and thus did not afford protection to the plaintiff.1 54 The Ger-
man labor tribunal questioned the validity of this provision in light of Commu-
nity law, and therefore referred the issue to the ECl for a preliminary ruling 
under Article 177.155 
The ECl interpreted Article 48 of the Treaty and Article 7 of Regulation 
1612/68 156 to ex plicitly establish termination as one of several conditions of 
employment which must apply equally to indigenous workers and to workers of 
other Member States if there is to be true freedom of movement within the 
Community.157 The ECl also reaffirmed the principle that Article 48's prohibi-
tion on discrimination affects the social security law of each Member State, 
requiring that each Member State afford the nationals of other Member States 
employed on its territory all the advantages which its grants its own nationals. 158 
The ECl, after interpreting the Community law relevant to the national court's 
question,I;;9 directed the German labor tribunal to apply the ECl's interpretation 
of law to the facts of the case. 
c. Article 177 and the Process of Integration 
Article 177 ensures uniform interpretation of Community law while leaving 
its actual application to the national courts. 160 The procedure of Article 177 is 
the only means by which the ECl is brought into direct relationship with the 
national courts of the Community.161 The institution of preliminary rulings is a 
process of judicial cooperation and division of powers, whereby the national 
152. [d. 
153. [d. al 1250, 12 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 503. 
154. [d. 
155. [d. at 1245, 12 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 502. 
156. Reg. 1612/68, supra note 20, art. 4. 
157. 1972 E. Comm Ct. J. Rep. at 1248-49,12 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 506. 
158. [d. 
159. The ECj has no power to annul or interpret Member State legislation. LIPSTEIN, supra note 110, 
at 33. But see Casagrande v. Landeshauptstadt Miinchen, 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 773, 14 Comm. 
Mkt. L.R. 423. The Court ruled in this case that although the ECj may not rule on the construction or 
validity of a national law under Article 177, it could nevertheless construe provisions of Community law 
and in the process conclude whether such provisions apply to measures taken by national authorities. !d. 
at 778, 14 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 431. 
Sometimes the ECl's interpretation of Community law is so clear that no other conclusion is possible 
than that the national law is void. Schermers, supra note 72, at 448. 
160. WALL, supra note 148, at 130. 
161. [d. at 131. Advocate General Lagrange in the Bosch case stated: "[T]he provisions of Article 177 
must lead to a real and fruitful collaboration between the municipal courts and the Court of justice of 
the Communities with mutual regard for their respective jurisdictions." 1962 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 45, 
56, 1 Comm. Mkt. L. R. 1, 6. 
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court and the Court of justice "are called upon to contribute directly and 
reciprocally to reaching a decision so as to ensure the uniform application of 
Community law in all Member States."162 This "dialogue between the national 
courts" and the ECj is, therefore, an important factor in the judicial process of 
integration. 16:l Application of Article 177 results in the use of one communal law 
in national courts. Furthermore, because domestic law may not compromise the 
effectiveness of Community law, Community law is changing domestic law so 
that it conforms with the community ideal expressed in the Treaty.164 As a 
consequence, "the procedure under Article 177 has served to awaken Commu-
nity citizens to the spreading web and interdependence of Community and 
national law."165 
d. The Eel's Liberal Interpretation of the Freedom of Movement Provisions 
Article 177 has been an especially effective tool of political integration when 
used by the EC j in the context of freedom of movement cases. When confronted 
with a referral under Article 177, the ECJ has customarily ruled that, although 
the offending national legislation or practice may be in area apparently remote 
from the free movement of labor, and although the legislation or practice may 
only minimally or indirectly impede the free movement of workers, Community 
law must nevertheless prevail. As a consequence, the integrative and unifying 
effect of preliminary rulings has affected diverse areas of substantive national 
law beyond simply worker movement and the plain language of Article 48_51. 166 
The im petus for the ECl's liberal interpretation of Article 48-51 lies partially 
in the importance which both the EEC Treaty and the ECj ascribe to freedom of 
movement in the process of achieving economic union. ls7 However, the ECj has 
interpreted the free movement provisions in a more liberal manner than would 
be necessary to achieve merely the Treaty's economic objectives. 16H Instead, the 
ECj has also acknowledged the objectives of social and political integration latent 
within the free movement provisions. 16" The Court recognizes that, beneath the 
162. PESCATORE, supra note 24, at 99, quoting Schwarze v. Einfuhr-und Vorratsstelle Getreide und 
Futtermittel, 1965 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 877, 886. The ECJ has avoided presenting itself as a "superior" 
court. Instead, it has stressed that it is a special court with a specific task on an equal footing with 
national courts who have their own specific tasks. Schermers, supra note 72, at 447-48. 
163. See generally MANN, supra note 29, at 383-432. 
164. A national court therefore participates simultaneously in two separate but interwoven legal 
orders: Community law and that of the Member State. See generally Kutscher, Community Law and the 
National Judge, 89 LAW Q. REV. 487 (1973). 
165. Feld & Slotnick, supra note 59, at 333. 
166. For cases clearly falling within the purview of Article 48 and worker movement, see, e.g., Michel 
Choquet, 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2293, 24 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. 535 (involving conditions for the 
issue of drivers licenses); the residency requirement and deportation cases, e.g., The State v. Sagulo, 
1977 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1495, 20 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 585; and the cases discussed in § III. D infra 
167. See text accompanying notes 7-15 supra. 
168. WYATT & DASHWOOD, supra note 22, at 126-27. 
169. See id. Wyatt and Dashwood cite the opinion of Advocate General Trabucchi in Mr. and Mrs. F. 
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economic objectives of the provisions regulating free movement of labor, the 
inspiration for Articles 48-51 "is no less than the ultimate aim of the Treaty - 'to 
eliminate the barriers which divide Europe.' "170 
In Casagrande v. Landeshauptstadt Munchen,171 for example, the ECl was called 
upon by a German Court to interpret the first amendment of Article 12 of 
Regulation 1612/68,172 which requires that the children of an EEC non-national 
worker shall be admitted to a Member State's general educational programs 
"under the same conditions as the nationals of such State."173 The Court spe-
cifically focused on the question of whether Article 12 applied to only actual 
access to educational programs, or related to all advantages the host state af-
forded its nationals in the educational field (e.g., educational grants).174 Defen-
dants argued that educational and cultural matters were not within the scope of 
the EEC Treaty, which they asserted was essentially concerned with economic 
matters. 175 The Council, in legislating about educational grants in Article 12 of 
Regulation 1612/68, had therefore exceeded its powers.176 Advocate General 
Warner177 agreed that the power of the Council under Article 49178 did not 
include the power to legislate about ed ucational matters per se. 179 However, the 
Advocate General continued, the Council's power "is a power to legislate for the 
freedom of movement of workers, which includes power to legislate about the 
education of their children."180 The ECl, agreed181 with the Advocate General's 
conclusion that the narrower interpretation of Article 12 would violate the spirit 
of Regulation 1612/68,182 the purpose of which was to facilitate the integration 
of the families of migrant workers, especially their children, into the host coun-
try.183 
v. Belgian State, in which the Advocate General eschewed' a purely functiomil economic approach and 
recognized the social and political objectives of Articles 48-51: 
If we want Community law to be more than a mere mechanical system of economics and to 
constitute instead a system commensurate with the society which it has to govern, if we wish to 
be a legal system corresponding to the concept of social justice and to the requirements of 
European integration, not only of the economy but of the people, we cannot disappoint the 
Belgian Court's expectations, which are more than those of legal form. 
1975 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 697, 16 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 452. 
170. WYATT & DASHWOOD, supra. note 22. at 127. 
171. 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 773. 14 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 423. 
172. Reg. 1612/68. supra note 20. art. 12. 
173. Id .• as translated in I COMMON MKT. REp. (CCH) If 1031 M. The Casagrande case involved the son 
of a deceased Italian national who had worked in Munich. The son was refused an educational grant on 
the basis of his nationality. 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 775, 14 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 424-25. 
174. 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 782, 14 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 427. 
175. !d. at 783. 14 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 429. 
176. !d. 
177. For a description of the advocates-general, see note 125 supra. 
178. EEC Treaty, supra note I, art. 49. 
179. 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 783, 14 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 429. 
180. [d. 
181. [d. at 778. 14 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 431-32. 
182. [d. at 784. 14 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 429. 
183. [d. at 782. 14 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 427-28. The ECJ held that this integrative purpose "presup-
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Similarly, in Wurttembergische Milchverwertung-Sudmilch AG v. Ugliola,184 the 
ECl broadly interpreted Article 48185 and its implementing legislation. The 
respondent, Ugliola, an Italian national, was employed by the appellant in the 
Federal Republic of Germany.186 He interrupted his work for approximately 
fifteen months to perform compulsory military service in Italy and then immedi-
ately resumed work in Germany.187 German legislation provided that military 
service would be taken into consideration in the calculation of one's seniority at 
work, which would have resulted in Ugliola's receiving a larger bonus. lSB How-
ever, Ugliola's employer and the German government contended that such 
legislation was inapplicable in Ugliola's case because it concerned only military 
law, not labor law, and therefore could not be considered as forming part of the 
conditions of employment and work which are subject to Community law. 189 
Advocate General Gand and the ECl, however, once again upheld the broad 
scope of the guarantee of freedom of movement and found that it affected even 
national military law. 190 The ECl agreed that the German law at issue was clearly 
associated with national defense, but, because the law formed part of the "condi-
tions of employment and work" within the meaning of Article 7 of Regulation 
1612/68, the Court found that the matter was within its jurisdiction and interpre-
tation.191 
The ECl broadly interpreted Article 7 of Regulation 1612/68 on a subsequent 
poses that, in the case of the child of a foreign worker who wishes to have secondary education, this 
child can take advantage of benefits provided by the laws of the host country relating to educational 
grants, under the same conditions as nationals who are in a similar position." [d. at 778, 14 Comm. Mkt. 
L.R. at 431-32. This same rationale was used by the ECJ in Michel S. v. Fonds national de reclassement 
social des handicapes, 1973 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 457, [1975 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. 
(CCH) ~ 8324, to justify its broad interpretation of Article 12 of Reg. 1612/68 in that case. There, the 
ECJ held that access to "general education" as provided for in Article 12 also included rehabilitation 
for a worker's handicapped son. 
184. 1969 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 363, 9 Comm. Mkt. L. R. 194. 
185. EEC Treaty, supra note I, art. 48. 
186. 1969 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 371, 9 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 195. 
187. [d. 
188. [d. at 371-72, 9 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 195. 
189. [d. at 373, 9 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 197. The Bundesarbeitsgericht, the final court of appeal in the 
field of labor law, asked the ECj, pursuant to Article 177, whether such treatment of an EEC 
non· national worker was discriminatory and therefore prohibited under Article 48 and, more specif-
ically, under Article 7 of Reg. 1612/68. [d. at 368, 9 Comm. Mkt. L.R at 201. Article 7 of Reg. 1612/68 
provides that a worker who is a national of another Member State shall enjoy the same protection and 
treatment given nationals of that State in respect of all conditions of employment and work. Reg. 
1612/68, supra note 20, art. 7. Respondent's employer argued that because the German statute at issue 
concerned military matters and not freedom of movement of workers, it could not be considered within 
the scope of regulations issued under Article 49 or any other part of the Treaty. 1969 E. Comm. Ct. J. 
Rep. at 373, 9 Comm. Mkt. L.R at 197. As such, defendants argued, the question was not within the 
jurisdiction of the ECJ. [d. at 374, 9 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 198. Defendants cited EEC Treaty Articles 
223(1)(b) and 224, which permit Member States to legislate freely in the area of defense. !d. at 373, 9 
Comm. Mkt. L.R at 197. 
190. [d. at 374, 9 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 198. 
191. !d. 
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occasion in Fiorini v. S.N.C.F. IH2 French legislation provided that in families with 
three or more children under the age of 18, the father, mother and each child 
under 18 could receive an identity card entitling them to a reduced fare on the 
French National Railway (S.N.C.F.).193 Mrs. Fiorini, an Italian national residing 
in France with four children under the age of 18, requested and was refused a 
card on the basis that the cards were only for the benefit of French citizens. 194 
Mrs. Fiorini brought an action against S.N.C.F. on the grounds of Article 7(2) of 
Regulation 1612/68, which provides that a national of a Member State employed 
in another Member State shall enjoy the same social and tax advantages as 
national workers.193 The Cour d'Appel of Paris l96 sought a preliminary ruling 
from the ECl on the interpretation of the Article. The Court ruled that the 
Article applied to all social and tax advantages, whether or not attached to the 
contract of employment, that a national worker enjoys.197 
The ECl has therefore interpreted Articles 48-51 and the implementing 
legislation under these Articles in a consistently broad manner. Because most of 
the ECl's judgments are made by way of preliminary ruling,19" national courts 
must apply the Court's interpretation of Community law in a correspondingly 
broad manner, which in turn affects diverse areas of substantive national law. It 
is when the ECl fills such gaps in Community legislation with broad interpreta-
tions that its role becomes similar to that of a legislature. 199 
C. The ECl Sustains the Supranational Structure of the Community 
One of the principal characteristics of supranationalism, as discussed above,20o 
is that the supranational institutions stand between, rather than over, the 
192. 1975 E. Comm. Ct.]. Rep. 1085, 17 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 573. 
193. !d. at 1086, 17 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 574. 
194. Id. 
195. Reg. 1612/68, supra note 20, art. 7(2). The Tribunal de Grande Instance, Paris, dismissed her 
claim, agreeing with S.N.C.F. that the Article referred exclusively to an individual's status as a worker. 
1975 E. Comm. Ct.]. Rep. at 1087, 17 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 575. As such, the Article had no application 
to benefits such as a reduction card. Mrs. Fiorini appealed to the Cour d'Appel, Paris. 
196. There are thirty cours d'appel in metropolitan France. A VON MEHREN &]. GORDLEY, THE 
CIVIL LAW SYSTEM 103 (2nd ed. 1977). French procedure provides for review of judgments in first 
instance by way of appeal to these courts. !d. at 102. The court of last resort in the system of regular 
courts in France is the Cour de cassation. Id. at 104. 
197. 1975 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1094, 17 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 582. 
198. Schermers, supra note 72, at 453. 
199. See !d. at 453-64. 
The Court is in a strong position to playa creative role w hen it is dealing with an unforeseen 
ambiguity in the detailed provisions which make up the body of the treaty. The so-called 
unprovided case can, indeed, be decided by reference to broad treaty goals in light of the 
treaty's fundamental principles. This is the variety of judicial activism that no court can escape. 
S. SCHEINGOLD, THE RULE OF LAw IN EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 21 (1965). But see Donner, Th£ Constitu-
tional Powers ofth£ Court of Justice ofth£ European Communities, II COMM. MKT. L. REv. 127, 139-40 (1974) 
(where it is asserted that the ECl is not involved in any type of legislating activity). 
200. See notes 43-46 and accompanying text supra. 
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Member States. 201 For example, when rendering a preliminary ruling under 
Article 177, the ECl does not function as a superior or appellate court which 
reviews the correctness of the nation court's ruling; instead, it performs its 
particular duties in conjunction with the national courts.202 The ECl performs 
two other functions which illustrate the Court's capacity as a supranational 
mediator. First, the Court has power to resolve controversies between Commu-
nity institutions and governments of Member States. Second, the Court has 
power to resolve controversies between Member States. 
l. Controversies between Community Institutions and Governments of 
Member States 
Under Article 155,203 the Community Commission has a duty to ensure that 
Member States comply with provisions of the Treaty and Community legislation. 
If the Commission determines that a Member State has failed to fulfill any of its 
Community obligations, it may first request that the Member State rectify its 
omission. 204 Should the Member State fail to comply with the Commission's 
request within the time period set by the Commission,205 Article 169 authorizes 
the Commission to refer the matter to the ECj.206 
The ECl has received two cases in the field of freedom of movement for 
workers under Article 169.207 In E.C. Commission v. France, 208 as noted earlier,209 
the Commission determined that Section 3(2) of the French Merchant Seamen 
Code of 1926 contravened certain provisions of Regulation 1612/68. 210 Before 
referring this question to the Court, however, the Commission requested that 
the }<'rench government amend the legislation to comply with the Community 
provisions.211 Although the French government agreed, it took no action. After 
the government ignored a second request, the Commission delivered a "rea-
20 I. See note 44 supra. 
202. See note 162 supra. 
203. EEC Treaty, supra note I, art. 155. 
204. [d., art. 169. Article 169 provides: 
If the Commission considers that a Member State has failed to fulfill any of its obligations 
under this Treaty, it shall give a reasoned opinion on the matter after requiring such State to 
submit its comments. 
If such State does not comply with the terms of such opinion within the period laid down by 
the Commission, the latter may refer the matter to the Court of Justice. 
See e.g., E.C. Commission v. France, 1974 E. Comm. Ct.]. Rep. 359, 361-62, 14 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 216, 
217-18. 
205. It is up to the Commission, based upon the urgency of the matter, to determine when to initiate 
proceedings in the EC]. LIPSTEIN, supra note 110, at 314 n.4. 
206. EEC Treaty, supra note I, art. 169. See note 204 supra. See also LIPSTEIN, supra note 110, at 314. 
207. EEC Treaty, supra note I, art. 169. 
208. 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 359, 14 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 216. 
209. See text accompanying notes 129-36 supra. 
210. Reg. 1612/68, supra note 20. 
211. 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 361, 14 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 217. 
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soned opinion" to the French government under Article 169(1 ),212 and re-
quested compliance within thirty days.21:l Upon failure of the French to comply 
within that period, the Commission brought the matter before the Court. 214 
As part of its case, the French government challenged the existence of the 
Commission's legal interest to bring the matter before the Court. 215 However, 
the ECl ruled that under Article 169, the Commission did not have to show the 
existence of a legal interest, since the Commission's duty under Article 169 was to 
ensure Member States' compliance with the Treaty.216 
The Commission also utilized the procedure of Article 169217 in E.C. Commis-
sion ,I. Belgium. 21 H In that case, the Commission discovered that Belgian nation-
ality was a prerequisite for employment in certain posts with Belgian govern-
ment authorities and undertakings, irrespective of the nature of the duties to be 
performed. 21 !l The Commission considered such a hiring policy to constitute 
discrimination on the basis of nationality which in turn constitutes an obstacle to 
the free movement of workers within the Community.220 
The ECl reserved final judgment in E.C. Commission v. Belgium because it felt 
that it did not have sufficient facts before it regarding the various jobs at issue. 
The Court ordered the parties to reexamine the issue in light of the legal 
principles it laid out221 and then to resubmit the case to the Court for a final 
judgment.222 In E.C. Commission v. France, on the other hand, the ECl ultimately 
agreed with the Commission's position and found that France was in violation of 
its obligations under the Treaty.22:3 According to Article 171, France was then 
obliged to "take the measures required for the implementation of the judgment 
of the Court."224 
212. EEC Treaty, supra note I, art. 169(1). 
213. 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 362, 14 Comm. Mkt. L. R. at 218. 
214. [d. 
215. [d. at 368, 14 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 227. 
216. [d. at 368-69, 14 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 277-28. 
217. EEC Treaty, supra note I, art. 169. 
218. 1980 E. Comm. Ct.]. Rep. 3881, 31 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 413. 
219. [d. at 3884, 31 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 415. 
220. [d. The Commission was well aware of the exception in Article 48(4), which provides that 
discrimination on the basis of nationality is permitted in the public service. See note II, supra. However, 
the Commission's view was that the exception covered only posts involving actual participation in official 
authority as part of their duties. 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 3884-85, 31 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 415. In 
other words, the positions in question (e.g., unskilled national railroad workers and nurses employed in 
the national health care system) would not fall within Article 48(4)'s exception because they were no 
different from similar posts in the private sector. [d. at 3885, 31 Common. Mkt. L.R. at 415. 
221. See text accompanying notes 260-65 infra 
222. 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 3905, 31 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 437. 
223. 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 359, 374, 14 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 216, 231. 
224. EEC Treaty, supra note I, art. 171. If France had subsequently ignored the ECl's judgment, the 
Court would have been without enforcement or sanction powers under the Treaty. The most that the 
EC] could have done in such a situation is to issue a declaratory judgment that the Member State had 
failed to carry out its obligations under Article 171. LIPSTEIN, supra note 110, at 314-15. Any more 
serious sanction may evoke an undesirable response from a Member State, which may threaten the 
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The ECj has sustained the Commission's suspicions of a Treaty violation in the 
majority of cases which the Commission has brought before it. 225 According to 
one member of the European Court, the high success rate of the Commission is 
due primarily to its nature as an objective supranational institution identified 
with the interests of the entire Community rather than with any secularized 
national interests. 226 As such, the Commission is able to provide the ECj un-
biased legal evaluations and technical information which are quite helpful to the 
Court in its decision-making process.227 
The settlement of controversies by the Court in favor of the Commission has a 
definite integrative effect; Community law is upheld and applied and the author-
ity of the Community institutions is enhanced. Secondly, this procedure re-
emphasizes and strengthens the supranational structure of the Community. The 
working relationship between the Commission and the ECj, and the relationship 
of these two community institutions to the Member States best demonstrates the 
Community's resemblance to a federal system. 22 " 
2. Controversies between Member States 
An issue may also arrive before the ECj through the mechanics of Article 
170.229 Under Article 170, one Member State may bring an action against 
another Member State for the alleged infringement of an obligation under the 
Treaty.23o No case has yet been brought before the ECj by this method;231 
however, Member States have expressed opposing views on an issue before the 
Court232 and have occasionally intervened in cases pending before the Court.2:l3 
incipient federal structure of the Community. Instead, an appeal to public opinion of the Community 
may be sufficient to assure compliance. Feld & Slotnick, supra note 59, at 335. In no case, however, has a 
Member State failed to comply with ajudgment of the ECl, although in a few instances compliance has 
taken a long time. Id. at 336. 
225. Feld & Slotnick, supra note 59, at 336. See GREEN, supra note 31, at 222-26 for a detailed analysis 
of the success rate of the Commission in cases in which the Commission was either a party or otherwise 
involved in the litigation. 
In most instances in which the Commission has charged a Member State with objectionable conduct, 
however, the matter is settled before it reaches the ECl by the State correcting its behavior. Intervention 
by the Court is only a final and exceptional sanction. PESCATORE, supra note 24, at 81-82. 
226. PESCATORE, supra note 24, at 80. Pierre Pescatore has been a member of the ECl since 1967. 3 
COMMON MKT. R.EP. (CCH) p. 13,077. 
227. [d. See also Schermers, supra note 72, at 446. 
228. Feld & Slotnick, supra note 59, at 335. See notes 58-62 and accompanying text supra. 
229. EEC Treaty, supra note I, art. 170. 
230. [d. 
231. Feld & Slotnick, supra note 59, at 344. 
232. See note 146 supra. 
233. A request for intervention is a unilateral request by a Member State or Community institution 
to be joined to pending proceedings before the ECl in order to support the submissions of one of the 
parties to the litigation. Member States and Community institutions may intervene in any circumstance; 
however, the intervening party may not advance independently any rights of its own or seek to establish 
legal propositions unrelated to the claims of the original parties. L1PSTE1N, supra note 110, at 342-44. 
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In the Casagrande case,234 the Commission, together with the government of 
Italy,235 argued for the broader interpretation of Community law, whereas 
German authorities advocated a narrower reading of the law. In E.C. Commission 
v. Belgium,236 the governments of France, Germany and the United Kingdom 
intervened in the case on behalf of the government of Belgium. 
The fact that these cases reached the ECl after settlement attempts had failed 
indicates an intentional shifting of final decision-making from the state to Com-
munity leveJ.237 Problems which a Member State had previously resolved inter-
nally are now referred to the authority of the Court if that problem concerns 
matters covered by the Treaty.238 This process is an illustration of how the 
Member States have sacrificed part of their own national sovereignty to the 
Community System.239 Furthermore, the fact that Member States may voice 
their often conflicting opinions as to the resolution of a matter pending before 
the Court, and the fact that the ECl's opinion is final and binding, illustrates the 
similarity of the ECl to a supreme court in a federation. 240 As a result, the 
authority of the Community, and especially the ECl, is enhanced. The case of 
Marsman v. Rosskamp241 demonstrates the increasing tendency of Member States 
to seek authoritative approval from the ECj. In Marsman, the Court considered 
whether a protection against termination of employment that the Member State 
provided only to nationals was violative of the Treaty. The participants in the 
proceeding242 were unanimous in their proposed answer to the question. All 
they sought was approval of their interpretation from the final authority, the 
ECj. 
D. Limits to Integration 
The cases analyzed thus far illustrate that the ECl has consistently limited state 
sovereignty in favor of guaranteeing the most complete right to free movement 
possible under the terms of the Treaty. However, two im portant exceptions exist 
to the broad guarantees of Article 48. Under the" public policy"243 and "public 
service"244 exceptions, Member States may, in order to protect important na-
234. See text accompanying notes 171-81 supra. 
235. Italy had already included the children of migrant workers in such educational grant programs. 
1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 783, 14 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 428. 
236. 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3881, 31 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 413. See also text accompanying notes 
218-22 supra. 
237. Feld & Slotnick, supra note 59, at 339. 
,238. [d. 
239. See GREEN, supra note 31, at 445. 
240. See text accompanying notes 58-64 supra. 
241. See text accompanying notes 151-59 supra. 
242. The participants in the proceeding were the plaintiff in the original action, the governments of 
Germany and Italy, and the Commission. 1972 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1251, 12 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 
503. 
243. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 48(3). 
244. [d., art. 48(4). 
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tional interests, restrict freedom of worker movement. The ECl's interpretation 
of these exceptions has resulted in the creation of a significant area of Member 
State autonomy, at the expense of further political integration. 
l. The Public Service Exception 
Article 48(4)245 declares that the "provisions of this article shall not apply to 
employment in the public service."246 On its face, the effect ofthis exception is to 
remove those jobs within a Member State's public service from the guarantees 
included in the first three paragraphs of Article 48. 247 National governments 
may therefore turn away applicants for government employment on the basis of 
nationality. 
The ECl first interpreted this exception in Sotgiu v. Deutsche Bundespost. 248 In 
this case, the German Federal Labor Court, seeking a ruling as to whether 
Article 7 of Regulation 1612/68249 applied to employees in the German Postal 
Service,250 referred the case to the ECl under Article 177. 
The ECl's opinion narrowed the public service exception in two respects. The 
Court held that Member States could restrict the admission of foreign EEC 
nationals to only "certain activities in the public service."251 In addition, the 
Court found that the exception did not justify discriminatory measures with 
regard to conditions of employment against those workers who had already been 
admitted to the public service. 252 
In Sotgui, the ECl failed to define the interests of the Member State which this 
exception is designed to protect. Similarly, the ECl did not define the "certain 
245. [d. 
246. [d. 
247. [d., art. 48. 
248. 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 153, [1974 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. CCH If 8257. 
Plaintiff was an Italian national employed by the German Postal Service. His family lived in Italy. 
Accordingly, plaintiff received a "separation allowance" of 7.50 DM per day, on the same basis as 
workers of German nationality. Government authorities increased the separation allowance to 10 DM 
per day for those workers residing in Germany at the time of their recruitment, while the allowance for 
those residing abroad at the time of their recruitment (both German and foreign alike) continued at the 
lower rate. The main issue before the ECj, apart from interpretation of the public service exception, 
was whether Article 7(1) and (4) of Reg. 1612/68 could be interpreted as prohibiting not only discrimi-
nation on the basis of nationality, but also on the basis of residence. Facts instrumental in the ECl's 
rulings were that payment of the higher rate was only temporary and was bound up with an obligation 
to transfer one's residence to the place of employment. In the case of workers whose residence is 
abroad, the allowance is paid for an indefinite period and is not bound up with any such obligation. The 
ECJ found that these objective differences in the situation of workers could be a valid reason for 
differentiating between the amounts paid. [d. at 164-65, [1974 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REp. 
(CCH) at 9165-7. 
249. See note 189 supra. 
250. 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 155, [1974 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REp. (CCH) at 9165. 
The German court also referred two other questions relating to the discrimination to the ECJ. See note 
248 supra. 
251. 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 162, [1974 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REp. (CCH) at 9165-6. 
252. !d. 
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activities" to which this exception applies. The Commission, however, addressed 
these issues in its submissions253 to the Court. First, the Commission emphasized 
that if Member States were free to define the scope of the term "public service," 
the fundamental right of free movement would assume a different meaning 
from state to state. Therefore, "public service," a Community law concept, 
should be determined according to Community law.254 More importantly, the 
Commission attempted to define more fully the "certain activities" which fall 
within the public service exception. In the opinion of the Commission, such 
positions should be limited to those which "authorize the exercise of sovereign 
activity with regard to individuals and thus make possible, in certain circum-
stances, the infringement of rights .... "255 The Commission indicated that such 
positions include, among others, those dealing with state secrets and state secu-
rity.256 
The Advocate General's opinion agreed with the Commission. He acknowl-
edged that Member States retain the sovereign power to determine the scope of 
public services necessary for the needs of their population, but that only the ECl 
may define "public service" as it is used in the Treaty.257 He also agreed that the 
Treaty should grant to the Member States the power to reserve for their own 
nationals only those positions which participate directly in the exercise of official 
authority over individuals or which involve internal security or defense.258 Fi-
nally, because of the problems involved in too rigidly interpreting the exception, 
the Advocate General recommended a case-by-case approach, in which the ECl 
should focus closely on factual criteria, such as the nature of the duties which 
each public servant performs.259 
The ECl settled some of the confusion in the interpretation of the "public 
service" exception by addressing each of these issues in E.C. Commission v. 
Belgium. 260 The ECl confirmed that the definition of "public service" for the 
purposes of Article 48(4)261 is a matter of Community law. 262 The Court there-
fore included in "public service" only those posts which "involve direct or 
indirect participation in the exercise of powers conferred by public law and 
duties designed to safeguard the general interests of the State or of other public 
authorities."263 The Court reasoned that "[s]uch posts in fact presume on the 
part of those occupying them the existence of a special relationship of allegiance 
253. For an explanation of "submissions," see note 146 supra. 
254. 1974 E. Comm. Ct.]. Rep. at 158, [1974 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REp. (CCH) at 9165-3. 
255. Id. at 159, [1974 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) at 9165-4. 
256. Id. at 160, [1974 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) at 9165-4. 
257. Id. at 169, [1974 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) at 9165-9 - 9165-10. 
258. /d. at 170, [1974 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) at 9165-10. 
259. Id. 
260. 1980 E. Comm. Ct.]. Rep. 3881, 31 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 413. 
261. EEC Treaty, supra note I, art. 48(4). 
262. 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 3903, 31 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 435-36. 
263. Id. at 3900, 31 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 433. 
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to the State and reciprocity of rights and duties which form the foundation of the 
bond of nationality."264 Finally, the ECl stated that, while Article 48(4) did not 
permit discrimination against EEC non-nationals with regard to posts outside the 
"public service," the Article did permit discrimination against such individuals 
with regard to promotion from lower posts to more sensitive ones within the 
"public service."265 
The ECl's interpretation of the "public service" exception reveals an im plicit 
recognition of a limit to its integrative powers. The Court is aware that Member 
States should retain sovereignty over the determination of qualifications for 
appointment to sensitive public posts. It appears at present that the furthest the 
ECl is willing to go in this area is to require that posts in nationalized industries 
or non-official government posts be opened to EEC non-nationals. Political 
integration of the Community has not reached the point at which member States 
are willing to allow non-nationals to govern or protect their citizens. In recogni-
tion of this fact, the ECl has refrained from allowing for that possibility in its 
"public service" cases. If the ECl were to require that Member States afford EEC 
non-nationals equal access to these sensitive posts, despite Member State opposi-
tion to such a requirement,266 the Court might discover that the consensus upon 
which its authority rests would be considerably weakened. 
2. The Public Policy Exception 
a. Introduction 
Paragraph 3 of Article 48 provides that the rights of an EEC national to 
(I) accept offers of employment in another Member State, (2) move freely for 
this purpose, (3) stay in the host country while employed and (4) remain in the 
state after having left employment are "subject to limitations justified on the 
grounds of public policy, public security or public health."267 Although the ECl 
has ruled that the exception applies only to the rights expressly referred to in 
paragraph 3 (and thus a Member State may not abridge the guarantee of equal 
conditions of work and employment granted under paragraph 2 on public policy 
grounds),268 the public policy exception nevertheless hinders the achievement of 
both the economic and political objectives of the freedom of movement provi-
264. /d. 
265. [d. at 3904, 31 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 436. Consistent with Advocate General Mayras' last point in 
the Sotgiu decision the ECl reserved judgment in E.C. Commission v. Belgium until it is given more 
precise information about the duties of the various jobs in issue. 
266. The governments of France, Germany and the United Kingdom intervened in E.C. Commis-
sion v. Belgium, opposing a broad interpretation of "public service." 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3881, 
3903. 31 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 413, 436. 
267. EEC Treaty, supra note I, art. 48(3). 
268. Wtirttembergische Milchverwertung - Stidmilch AG v. Ugliola, 1969 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 363, 
369,9 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 194, 201. 
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sions. The exception allows each Member State to deny entry to workers from 
other Member States and to deport EEC workers once within their territory on 
the grounds of vaguely-defined national interests. The Community Council has 
limited the scope of the exception in Directive 64/221,269 which provides that 
states may not use the exception to serve national economic ends.270 Neverthe-
less, Member States may still restrict the entry and movement of EEC non-
nationals for non-economic, political reasons. 
Although the ECl has permitted each Member State to define the substance 
and requirements of "public policy" in light of its own national needs,271 the 
Court has not allowed unfettered discretion in the application of this exception. 
Instead, the ECl has advocated a strict interpretation of Article 48(3), "so that its 
scope cannot be determined unilaterally by each Member State without being 
subject to control by the institutions of the Community."272 The ECl's decisions 
in this area reflect tension between Community control and Member State 
autonomy. 
b. Cases Interpreting the Exception 
The ECl first interpreted the public policy exception in the case of Van Duyn v. 
Home Office. 273 Van Duyn, a Dutch national, was a practicing member of the 
Church of Scientology.274 She desired to enter England to work for the College 
of the Church located there. 275 British immigration officials denied her entry to 
the country because the Secretary of State considered anyone associated with the 
Church to be undesirable. 276 Although the British government considered Sci-
entology to be socially harmful,277 the United Kingdom placed no legal restric-
tions upon the practice of Scientology.278 Van Duyn claimed that refusal of leave 
to enter violated her rights under the laws guaranteeing free movement of 
workers. 279 
The ECJ found no violation of Van Duyn's rights. While the Court held that 
exceptions to the fundamental right of free movement had to be interpreted 
narrowly,280 it ruled that competent national authorities nevertheless have some 
269. 7 ]. O. COMM. EUR. 850 (1964). 
270. /d. 
271. Van Duyn v. Home Office, 1974 E. Camm. Ct.]. Rep. 1337, 1350, 15 Camm. Mkt. L.R. 1,17; 
and Rutili v. French Minister af the Interiar 1975 E. Camm. Ct.]. Rep. 1219, 1231, 17 Camm. Mkt. L. 
Rep. 140, 155. 
272. Van Duyn, 1974 E. Camm. Ct.]. Rep. at 1350,15 Camm. Mkt. L.R. at 17. 
273. 1974 E. Camm. Ct. J. Rep. 1337, 15 Camm. Mkt. L.R. I. 
274. /d. at 1340, 15 Camm. Mkt. L.R. at 4. 
275. Id. 
276. Id. at 1340, 15 Camm. Mkt. L.R. at 4-5. 
277. Id. at 1339, 15 Camm. Mkt. L.R. at 4. 
278. Id. 
279. Id. at 1340, 15 Camm. Mkt. L.R. at 5. Van Duyn referred specifically ta art. 48, Reg. 1612/68, 
and art. 3 af Dir. 64/221. 
280. /d. at 1350, 15 Camm. Mkt. L.R. at 17. 
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discretion in determining the requirements of their country's public policy.2Hl 
The Treaty sanctions such discretion inasmuch as internal social conditions vary 
from one Member State to another and from one period to another. 2H2 In 
accordance with this interpretation, the Eel ruled that the Treaty did not 
require that the United Kingdom completely outlaw a particular activity before it 
could rely on the public policy exception to exclude an individual from the 
country on the basis of participation in that activity.283 The consequence of such 
an interpretation is that a Member State can justify discrimination upon the basis 
of nationality, an otherwise blatant violation of Articles 7284 and 48(2),285 by 
means of the public policy exception. 2H6 The Eel stated that: 
a Member State ... can, where it deems necessary, refuse a national 
of another Member State the benefit of the principle of freedom of 
movement for workers in a case where such a national proposes to 
take up a particular offer of employment even though the Member 
State does not place a similar restriction upon its own nationals. 28 7 
In Rutili (I. Minister Jor the Interior,288 the Eel again refused to hold that the 
non-discrimination principle of Articles 7 and 48 restricted the use of the public 
policy exception. Rutili, an Italian national, had lived in France all his life. 
French authorities, upon learning of Rutili's subversive political and trade union 
activities, restricted his residence to only certain departments289 within France 
because his presence in other departments was "likely to disturb public pol-
Id. 
281. Id. 
282. /d. 
283. Id. The Court stated that: 
where the competent authorities of a Member State have clearly defined their standpoint as 
regards the activities of a particular organization and where, considering it to be socially 
harmful, they have taken administrative measures to counteract these activities, the Member 
State cannot be required, before it can rely on the concept of public policy, to make such 
acti\[ities unlawful, if recourse to such a measure is not thought appropriate in the circum-
stances. 
284. EEC Treaty, supra note I, art. 7. 
285. Id., art. 48(2). 
286. 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1358, 15 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 13. Article 7's non-discrimination 
principle is, by its own terms, subject to special provisions of the Treaty, such as the public policy 
exception. EEC Treaty, supra note I, art. 7. 
The ECl also alluded to principles of international law as being supportive of such discrimination, 
i.e., that international law precludes a Member State from refusing its own nationals the right of entry 
or residence. 1974 E. Comm. Ct. l. Rep. at 1351, 15 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. at 18. For a criticism of this 
ground of the ECl's decision, see Note, Free Movement of Workers in the European Economic Community: The 
Public Policy Exception, 29 STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1288-89 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Note, Frep Movement]. 
287. 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1351, 15 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 18. 
288. 1975 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1219, 17 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 140. 
289. A department is "[o]ne of the territorial divisions of a country." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 393 
(rev. 5th ed. 1979). The division of France "into departments is somewhat analogous, both territorially 
and for governmental purposes, to the divisions of an American state into counties." Id. 
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icy."290 Such a restriction could be placed on French nationals only for certain 
criminal convictions or during a state of emergency.291 Therefore, a French 
national in Rutili's situation could not have been prohibited from living in certain 
departments of the country. 
The ECj ruled that the French government could restrict Rutili's residence 
only if it could restrict the residences of nationals in similar circumstances.292 
However, the ECj avoided ruling that the non-discrimination principles of 
Articles 7 and 48 limit a Member State's public policy powers by finding the 
public policy exception to be inapplicable in Rutili's case. The Court noted that 
the rights guaranteed by Article 48(3) apply throughout the entire territory of a 
Member State. The ECj reasoned that limitations to such rights, such as the 
public policy exception, similarly must be addressed to the entire territory. 
Because Rutili's situation involved only a partial territorial restriction, the Court 
found that France's public policy powers were not involved. Therefore, the 
Court could hold that Article 7 provided relief to Rutili without a consquence of 
that holding being that Article 7's non-discrimination principle limited the 
Member States' public policy powers.293 
The result of the Rutili case is paradoxical. Although the French authorities 
could not take steps to restrict Rutili's residence within France, the judgment 
contained no language preventing the government from subsequently deporting 
him.294 Deportation from the country on the grounds of public policy would not 
amount to a mere partial territorial restriction; therefore, Article 7's non-
discrimination principle would not apply to provide relief to Rutili in the more 
drastic event of his deportation. 
Two subsequent judgments of the Court have also dealt with the subject of 
deportation of EEC nationals from Member States of which they are not a 
citizen. These judgments are consistent with the paradoxical result mentioned 
above. In State v. Royer,295 Belgian authorities ordered a French national, who 
had failed to observe the proper alien registration formalities, to leave the 
country on the ground that he was unlawfully residing there. 296 The litigation 
arose when Royer disobeyed the order forbidding his return to Belgium. A 
290. 1975 E. Comm. Ct.]. Rep. at 1222, 17 Comm. Mkt. L.R at 142. See Regina v. Saunders, 1978 E. 
Comm. Ct.]. Rep. 1129,25 Comm. Mkt. L.R 216, where the ECl ruled that Treaty provisions on free 
movement of workers are inapplicable to situations which are wholly internal to a Member State; that is, 
where there is no factor connecting such a situation to any of the areas covered by Community law. The 
ECl found that no such factor exists where a Member State applies to its own national criminal penalties 
which may include a restriction on movement within its territory. 
291. 1975 E. Comm. Ct. Rep. at 1233, 17 Comm. Mkt. L.R at 156. 
292. [d. at 1235, 17 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 157. 
293. [d. at 1234-35, 17 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 157. 
294. Note, Free Movement, supra note 286, at 1291. 
295. 1976 E. Comm. Ct. ]. Rep. 497, 18 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 619. 
296. [d. at 499,18 Comm. Mkt. L.R at 622. The Court's opinion does not disclose whether the fact 
that Royer was previously prosecuted in France for various armed robberies and convicted of pander-
ing was a factor in the authorities' decision to deport. 
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Belgian court referred questions of interpretation of the public policy exception 
to the ECl.297 In State v. Watson,298 a British national iiving in Italy similarly 
failed to discharge obligatory Italian alien registration formalities,299 risking a 
fine and possible deportation.aoo Because the case involved, inter alia, interpreta-
tion of the public policy exception, the Italian court referred the case to the 
ECj.aol 
The ECl in both cases ruled that, while Member States could require nationals 
of other Member States to report their presence in the country, deportation was 
not an acceptable form of punishment for failure to observe such require-
ments. ao2 Since the issue in both cases involved the exercise of a fundamental 
right which the Treaty itself confers, i.e., freedom of movement of workers, the 
ECl made it clear that such conduct alone could not constitute a breach of public 
order.aoa The ECl held that Member States may impose penalties for failure to 
observe registration requirements if the penalty is not so disproportionate to the 
gravity of the infringement that the penalty impedes free movement. ao4 
In both of these cases, the ECl had the opportunity to establish the broader 
rule that the commission of a minor offense is an unjustifiable ground for 
deportation.ao5 Instead, the Royer decision indicates that Member States retain 
significant discretion with respect to the determination of how serious an offense 
must be before it warrants the offender's deportation. ao6 In one of the Court's 
297. 1976 E. Comm. Ct.]. Rep. at 500-01, IS Comm. Mkt. L.R at 623. 
29S. 1976 E. Comm. Ct. ]. Rep. IIS5, IS Comm. Mkt. L.R 552. 
299. Id. at I I 86-S7 , IS Comm. Mkt. L.R at 554. 
300. /d. at IIS7, IS Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 554. 
301. Id. at IIS7-SS, IS Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 555-56. 
302. Rqyer, 1976 E. Comm. Ct.]. Rep. at 513, IS Comm. Mkt. L.R at 639; Watson, 1976 E. Comm. Ct. 
]. Rep. at 119S, IS Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 571-72. 
303. Royer, 1976 E. Comm. Ct.]. Rep. at 513, IS Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 639. The Court stated: 
Consequently any decision ordering expulsion made by the authorities of a Member State 
against a national of another Member State covered by the Treaty would, if it were based solely 
on that person's failure to comply with the legal formalities concerning the control of aliens or 
on the lack of a residence permit, be contrary to the provisions of the Treaty. 
Id. at 513-14, IS Comm. Mkt. L.R at 639. 
304. Rqyer, 1976 E. Comm. Ct.]. Rep. at 514, IS Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 640; Watson, 1976 E. Comm. Ct. 
]. Rep. at 1199, IS Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 572. 
305. Earlier cases before national courts had demonstrated the need for the ECj to clarify whether 
conviction for a minor offense is sufficient grounds for deportation. In Re Expulsion of an Italian 
National, 4 Common Mkt. L.R 2S5, 2SS (Landgericht, Gtittingen 1963), the German court found that 
anyone of plaintiff's offenses, which included assault, theft, fraud and driving without a license, would 
justify deportation. In Re Expulsion of an Italian Worker, 4 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 53, 54 (Oberverwal-
tungsgericht, Miinster 1963), a second German court ruled that the right to expel an EEC non-national 
because of tax liability and convictions for fraud and reckless driving was not affected by EEC 
legislation. More recently, in Regina v. Secchi, 15 Common Mkt. L.R. 3S3, 394 (Metropolitan Magis-
trate, Marylebone 1975), an English court found that convictions for shoplifting, indecent exposure and 
"general irresponsibility" were sufficient to deport an Italian national. The English court so ruled even 
after consideration of Article 4S. Id. 
306. Rqyer, 1976 E. Comm. Ct.]. Rep. at 514, IS Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 639-40. The Court stated that: 
Member States may still expel from their territory a national of another Member State where 
the requirements of public policy and public security are involved for reasons otMT than the 
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most recent decisions in this area, Regina v. Bouc!zereau, 307 the ECl reaffirmed the 
discretion of Member States by stating that past conduct alone could constitute a 
sufficient threat to the requirements of public policy to warrant deportation. 30M 
Previous interpretation of Article 3 of Directive 64/221 309 indicated that deporta-
tion could be ordered only "for breaches of the peace and public security which 
might be committed by the individual affected" sometime in the future. 31o The 
ECl stated that whether past conduct alone may constitute such a threat is a 
question for national authorities and courts to consider in each individual 
case.3ll However, in Bouchereau the ECl also curtailed Member State discretion 
by increasing the gravity of an offense before the offense may constitute grounds 
for deportation: "[R]ecourse by a national authority to the concept of public 
policy presupposes ... the existence ... of a genuine and sufficiently serious 
threat to the requirements of public policy affecting one of the fundamental 
interests of society."312 
Two recent referrals to the ECl demonstrate that national courts have been 
unable to discern the degree of misbehavior necessary to justify deportation of 
an EEC non-national.313 In Adoui v. Belgian State and City of Liege 314 and Cornuaille 
v. Belgian State,315 plaintiffs were both French women working in Belgium. 
Belgian authorities sought expulsion of the women on the grounds that both 
were of "doubtful moral character."316 The Belgian court in which both actions 
failure to comply with formalities concerning the control of aliens without prejudice to the 
limits placed on their discretion by Community law as stated by the Court in its judgment [in 
Rutili) (emphasis added). [d. 
307. 1977 E. Comm. Ct.]. Rep. 1999,20 Common. Mkt. L.R. 800. In Bouchereau, an English court 
had fined the accused for possession of a relatively small amount of drugs. The English Magistrate 
found that such misbehavior did not rise to a level requiring deportation. The Magistrate referred 
questions concerning the interpretation of the public policy exception to the EC] under Article 177. 
308. Id. at 2013, 20 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 823. In this regard, Advocate General Warner states: 
[C)ases do arise, exceptionally, where the personal conduct of an alien has been such that, 
whilst not necessarily evincing any clear propensity on his part, it has caused such deep public 
revulsion that public policy requires his departure .... I think that in such a case a Member 
State may exclude a national of another Member State from its territory, just as a man may 
exclude from his house a guest, even a relative, who has behaved in an excessively offensive 
fashion. Although therefore, in the nature of things, the conduct of a person relevant for the 
purposes of Article 3 [of Dir. 64/221) will generally be conduct that shows him to have a 
particular propensity, it cannot be said that that must necessarily be so. 
Id. at 2022, 20 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 812. 
309. Directive 64/221, supra note 269, art. 3. 
31,0. Bonsignore v. Oberstadtdirektor der Stadt Koln, 1975 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 297, 307, 15 
Comm. Mkt. L.R. 472, 488. See text accompanying notes 323-25, infra. 
311. Bouchereau, 1977 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 2013, 20 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 823. However, as 
Advocate General Warner indicated, supra note 300, it probably would be only in exceptional cases that 
this question would arise. 
312. [d. at 2014, 20Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 824 (emphasis added). However, it remains within a Member 
State's discretion to define the "fundamental interests" of its society. 
313. The EC] has not yet ruled on these referrals. 
314. 32 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 547 (Court of First Instance, Liege, Belgium 1981). 
315. 32 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 554 (Court of First Instance, Liege, Belgium 1981). 
316. Adoui, 32 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 548; Cornuaille, 32 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 555. 
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were brought sought a preliminary ruling as to the limits of Member State 
discretion with respect to public policy. In particular, the national court asked 
whether a Member State may define behavhior which is not criminally punish-
able as constituting "a genuine and sufficiently serious threat affecting one of the 
fundamental interests of society" in order to expel a national of another Member 
State.317 The ECl's reply to the national court's questions should better define 
the gravity of misbehavior sufficient for deportation.3lB 
c. Limits to the Exception 
The ECj is aware of the need to impose limits on the amount of discretion 
national authorities may exercise with respect to the public policy exception. 
Some limitations have been referred to in the material immediately above. 
Otherwise, the ECl's efforts in this regard have taken place primarily within the 
Court's interpretation of Council Directive 64/22l. Article 3(1) and (2) of this 
Directive provide that "[m]easures taken on the grounds of public policy or 
public security shall be based exclusively on the personal conduct of the individ-
ual concerned" and "previous criminal convictions shall not in themselves consti-
tute grounds for the taking of such measures."319 In Van Duyn, the Advocate 
General interpreted Article 3(1) of Directive 64/221 as requiring an individual 
examination of the situation of each person subjected to a decision based on the 
protection of public policy.320 Such an examination would be a pre-condition for 
any measure taken by national authorities to restrict the free movement and 
employment of any migrant worker.321 This requirement was satisfied in Van 
Duyn because the Court found that present association or membership with an 
organization such as the Church of Scientology constituted "personal conduct" 
for the purpose of the provision.322 The Court subsequently narrowed Article 3 
of Directive 64/221 in Bonsignore v. Oberstadtdirektor der Stadt Koln,323 where the 
ECj found that national authorities could take measures such as deportation 
"only to the extent to which the personal conduct of the Community national 
317. Id. at 549 and 557. The question presents issues similar to those raised in Van Duyn. See text 
accompanying notes 273-79, sufrra. However, whether Van Duyn would be decided the same way today 
in light of subsequent decisions of the ECJ is questionable. 
318. In Pescastaing v. Belgian State, 1980 E. Comm. Ct.]. Rep. 691, 29 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 685, a case 
with facts similar to AdDU; and Comuaitte was referred to the EC]. However, only procedural questions 
and not any concerning the substantive grounds for deportation were referred to the Court. See note 
328, infra. 
319. 7 ].0. COMM. EUR. 850 (1964). 
320. 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1358, 15 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 12-13. 
321. !d. 
322. Id. at 1349, 15 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 17. 
323. 1975 E. Comm. Ct.]. Rep. 297, 15 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 472. In this case, Bonsignore was an Italian 
worker living in Germany. He unlawfully acquired a handgun with which he later accidentally killed his 
brother. Bonsignore was convicted of causing death by negligence and German authorities ordered him 
to be deported. Subsequent appeals resulted in referral to the ECJ under Article 177 of the question 
whether an EEC non-national could be deported for reasons of a general deterrent nature. 
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who had committed an offence constituted or was likely to constitute In the 
future such a threat to national public policy that the continued presence of the 
individual ... could no longer be tolerated."324 Measures taken by Member 
States in response to conditions extraneous to the individual case, such as for 
deterrent purposes, would be prohibited by the Directive. 325 
To these substantive limitations on the public policy exception the Court in 
Rutili added the procedural requirements that an individual be notified of the 
public policy grounds that form the basis of the government's restrictions taken 
against him and that the right to appeal the imposition of the restrictions be 
required.326 Furthermore, the ECl in Royer ruled that a decision ordering expul-
sion cannot be executed by a Member State until the EEC non-national has 
exhausted his remedies guaranteed by Articles 8 and 9 of Directive 64/22l. 327 
Articles 8 and 9 require that an EEC non-national shall have the same pro-
cedural conditions for appeal as are available to nationals with respect to ad-
ministrative law remedies and that he may exercise his right of defense before a 
competent authority which is not the same as that which adopted the measure 
restricting his freedom. 328 
d. Summary 
The ECl's decisions in the "public policy" area have demonstrated the Court's 
flexibility in recognizing the desires of the individual Member States to retain 
some autonomy in a uniform Community system. Political integration within the 
Community has not yet progressed to the point where the ECl may define a 
Community "public policy."329 The social and political values within each 
324. [d. at 311, 15 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 479. 
325. [d. at 307, 15 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 488. 
326. 1975 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1233, 17 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 156. 
327. Directive 641221, sUfrra note 269, arts. 8 & 9. 
328. [d. See Ruyer, 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 515-17, 18 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 641-42. See also 
Precastaing v. Belgian State, 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 691, 29 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 685. With respect to 
Article 80fDir. 64/221, the EC] found inPescastaing that expulsion did not have to be postponed until a 
decision is given on the success of the appeal provided that the alien is able to obtain a fair hearing and 
to present his defense despite the fact that he is out of the country. With respect to Article 9 of Dir. 
64/221, the ECJ found that a Community alien may not be expelled until the opinion of the competent 
authority has been obtained and notified to him. He may then be expelled immediately, subject to his 
right to stay in the territory until he has instituted proceedings under Article 8 of Directive 641221. 
Pescastaing, 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 712-15, 29 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 706-08. See also Regina v. 
Secretary of State for Home Affairs, 1980 E. Comm. Ct. Rep. 1585,28 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 308. 
329. In this regard, Advocate General Mayras submitted to the EC] in Van Duyn: 
[I]f a "Community public policy" exists in areas where the Treaty has the aim or the effect of 
transferring directly to Community institutions power previously exercised by Member States, 
it can only be an economic public policy relating for exam pie to Community organizations of the 
agricultural market. ... 
On the other hand, it seems to me that, under present conditions and given the present 
position of the law, Member States have sole power, given the exceptions expressed in certain 
Community provisions ... to take measures for the safeguarding of public security within their 
territory and to decide the circumstances under which that security may be endangered. 
1974 E. Comm. Ct.]. Rep. at 1357, 15 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 11 (emphasis added). 
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Member State remain independent of one another. Nevertheless, the ECl has 
made substantial progress in defining the boundaries of discretion within which 
Member States may operate to compromise freedom of movement on the 
grounds of public policy. Whether the ECl will further limit that discretion, 
thereby moving closer to a Community public policy, or whether it will retreat to 
its position in Van Duyn, remains to be seen. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The provIsIons of the Treaty establishing the EEC embody the voluntary 
transfer of sovereign powers from the Member States to the institutions of the 
Community. It is this partial transfer of sovereignty that most clearly identifies 
the EEC as a supranational organization. This transfer of sovereign powers is 
also the central feature in the process of political integration. In its role as the 
final interpretor of Community law, the ECl constantly renews the agreements 
of the Treaty, thereby continuing this transfer of power arid advancing the 
process of political integration. 
This Comment has used the ECl's decisions interpreting Articles 48-51 of the 
Treaty as an illustration of the Court's role in the process of political integration. 
The ECl has interpreted broadly the provisions guaranteeing freedom of 
movement for the EEC worker, and has interpreted strictly the exceptions 
derogating from that right. The result has been a more complete integration of 
the laws, economies and societies of the Member States. 
The Community, however, has not yet attained complete integration of its 
Member States. The process of integration has slowed in recent years, causing 
some commentators to believe that the Community is foundering. Although 
these claims seem exaggerated, the Community has not progressed significantly 
beyond the common market state. Because the Member States continue to enjoy 
exclusive competence and power in certain areas, the EEC remains only a 
"partial and incipient" federation.330 The Court's interpretation of the public 
service and public policy exceptions demonstrates that the ECl recognizes that 
Member States still retain a large degree of independence in determining social 
standards. In its role in the process of political integration, the ECl has therefore 
balanced two desirable yet potentially conflicting goals: maintaining Member 
State autonomy in matters which remain important to the Member States, while 
advancing the transfer of state sovereignty to the Community whole in other 
areas. This balancing role has required the ECl to gauge the political consensus 
of the Community. As a result, the Court has been careful not to weigh one goal 
too heavily against the other. Too strong a strive for power and Community 
integration by the ECl might raise opposition from the national governments 
and judiciaries; however, too great a restraint would prevent the Court from 
330. See note 52, supra. 
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becoming a federal element and would result in insufficient protection of rights 
created by the Treaty. 
As illustrated by recent referrals to the ECl under the public policy exception, 
the Court is now in a position to move toward more Communal social standards. 
The ECl should continue its broad interpretation of Community rights and so 
advance the process of integration. However, the continued success of the Court 
also requires that it not lose sight of its fundamental balancing role described 
above. The present situation of a powerful Community Court and a relatively 
weak Community legislative process raises the apprehension that the Court may 
assume an excessive role in solving questions requiring political solutions and 
may unilaterally form Community common policy which the Member States are 
not yet ready to accept. However, the ECl's past decisions are an indication that 
the Court will resist such a role and continue the process of integration within 
the political consensus on which its legitimacy depends. 
Kurt F. Somerville 
